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Abstract
We examine whether the ‘fear’ of globalisation can be rationalised by
economic theory. To do so, we depart from the standard AD/AS (partial)
equilibrium model where the coordinational role of the Auctioneer is sub-
stituted by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie, [11]).
By endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices,
individual proﬁt-maximizing production decisions become interdependent
in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic compara-
tive statics exercises, we show that ‘competitiveness’ matters in a precise
sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home produc-
ers’ ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability
to forecast the proﬁt consequences of their production decisions. When
performing a standard open economy exercise in such a framework, we
show that the existence of standard eﬃciency gains -due to the increase
in competition (or spatial price stabilization)- is traded-oﬀ against coor-
dination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing
price expectations). Therefore, we identify a new rationale for an exoge-
nous price intervention in open economy targeting coordination, to allow
trading countries to fully reap the beneﬁts from trade. We illustrate this
point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of
economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice integration
between two expectationally stable economies.
Keywords: Open Economy, Rational Expectations, Coordination,
Common Knowledge.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well established that one of the potential beneﬁts of economic integra-
tion, and economic openness in general, stems in equalizing the prices of those
commodities produced at diﬀerent (real) costs across regions. In a standard
partial equilibrium competitive framework with heterogeneous producers facing
an identical demand across regions, free trade will result in lower aggregate prof-
its for the country producing at a higher relative cost. The consumers of that
country will beneﬁt from a lower price, relative to autarky1. With symmetric
cost structures across regions, diﬀerences in consumers’ valuations also explain
the existence of trade induced eﬃciency gains in real cost terms, i.e. in costs per
unit of purchasing power. Overall, the increase in competition between hetero-
geneous producers that free trade brings in, rewards the relatively more eﬃcient
ones in (real) cost terms, as well as the higher valuation consumers, and results
in a free trade equilibrium price that ’averages’ the autarky prices. Hence, the
meaning of (spatial) price stabilization in the abstract.
As for the abstract’s wording ’stability of price expectations’, we depart
from a class of models where inﬁnitesimal producers understand that the proﬁt
consequences of their individual production decisions depend on an aggregate
of the decisions taken by the rest, conﬁning them to a strategic framework
where they need to form expectations on others’ actions (and expectations)2.
There, producers try to forecast the consequences of that aggregate on the
prevailing market price, recognizing that, ultimately, the aggregate depends
on the price forecasts (or expectations) that each other producer individually
forms. Then, the ’stability of price expectations’ refers to those situations where
producers can individually forecast the actual market price, and are therefore
able to individually coordinate on a course of action which conﬁrms the forecast
(expectational coordination).
Finally, the abstract’s trade-oﬀ relates to the eﬀect of free trade on the ability
of producers to forecast the equilibrium price3. In the class of models consid-
ered, Guesnerie [14] convincingly argues that although strategic substituabilities
1A recent strand of the trade literature examines intra-industry eﬀects of international
trade in a general equilibrium setup with ﬁrm-heterogeneity (see Bernard et al. [2] or Melitz
[20]). There, trade induces a labor reallocation from least to most productive plants, inducing
endogenous entry and exit from the industry relative to autarky. Although in the simple partial
equilibrium model considered we cannot consider this issue, we still capture the cross-country
proﬁt redistribution channel due to the increase in competition, absent in these models.
2This basic framework encompasses the reduced form of standard macroeconomic models
in their non-noisy versions, like the Lucas aggregate supply model or a simple version of the
Cagan inﬂation model. See Evans and Honkapohja [8] for additional details. As well, it can
be seen as the competitive limit model of a large Cournot game, where producers are ’small’
with respect to the market size. See Guesnerie’s [11] F.N. 2, Novshek [23] or Vives [26] for
further details.
3Examples of the literature on ﬁrm dynamics with heterogeneous ﬁrms, such as Hopenhayn
[17] or Melitz [20], assume that ﬁrms are uncertain about their productivity and face sunk
entry costs, so that they have to take forward looking decisions anticipating future probabilities
of exit. Both assume that ﬁrms correctly anticipate the stationary equilibrium productivity
probability distribution. In this work we study the conditions under which producers can
actually learn the equilibrium probability distribution.
2(or complementarities) determine the sign of agents’ reactions to expectations,
what is instrumental for expectational coordination is the magnitude of these
reactions. Spatial price equalization (or stabilization) creates a redistributional
conﬂict between the producers of the integrating regions, leading some to ex-
pect higher prices and others lower ones, relative to autarky. These conﬂicting
policy-induced expectations, when coupled with producers’ integration-related
increased heterogeneity, are likely to undermine the reliability of producers’ fore-
casts. In consequence, spurious price volatility and multiple equilibria may arise,
making more compelling an ’exogenous price intervention’ after integration than
it was in autarky. Then, because producers’s (real) costs diﬀer spatially, both
standard eﬃciency gains justify a free trade policy change, and the plausibility
of the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium price is undermined, qualifying
the free trade policy change.
This new ’rationale’ for intervention was ﬁrst illustrated by Guesnerie’s [11]
one-dimensional version of Muth’s [22] model where producers, endowed with
more realistic abilities, managed in some cases to coordinate on the unique
equilibrium, in the absence of any explicit coordinating institution4.W h e n
coordination was unsuccessful, an exogenous device could be implemented to
achieve (expectational) coordination5. That insight proved general enough so
as to encompass many of the standard macroeconomic models, consolidating
as an alternative approach to the literature justifying the implementation of
a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE, from here on) through (adaptive)
learning. This alternative approach is called ’eductive’ learning6.I nt h i sw o r k
we take advantage of this approach to relate open economy expectational stabil-
ity conditions to autarkic ones. Essentially, we compare equilibria7 before and
after a policy change (economic integration), which is also of interest because, as
Evans and Honkapohja state, ”learning is the adjustment mechanism whereby
the economy is steered to the new equilibrium after a structural change” ([8],
p.81).
Summary of Results
’Eductive’ expectational coordination is characterized by a condition on elas-
ticities, identiﬁed by Guesnerie [11]. This condition has a natural interpretation
in open economy. When new markets are available to the producers of a partic-
ular region ceteris paribus, Guesnerie’s [11] discussion on the ’stabilizing’ role
of a high demand elasticity suggests that producers’ strategic uncertainty will
be alleviated, because own production decisions become less sensible to others’
expectations. Therefore, as new markets render forecasts more reliable, they
favour expectational coordination. However, opening the home market to for-
4Notice that there is also a sense in which the eductive viewpoint oﬀers new hope in
overcoming some of the old arguments for coordination at the international level, as it provides
conditions favouring coordination in the absence of explicit coordinating institutions.
5This ’new rationale’ for intervention is carefully developed in Guesnerie [12].
6See Guesnerie [14] for an exposition of the eductive learning approach, applications to
standard macroeconomic models and its relation to the adaptive approach.
7We comment below on the connection with the global comparative statics results obtained
by Milgrom and Roberts [21].
3eign producers ceteris paribus will have the opposite eﬀect. Producers’ decisions
become more interdependent in a truly strategical sense, because an increase in
the relative abundance of the product, increases the sensibility of the ﬁnal price
to others’ production decisions, undermining the reliability of home producers’
forecasts relative to autarky. Economic integration, by combining both, will
have an ambiguous net eﬀect on the reliability of producers’ forecasts, and thus
on coordination.
Our ﬁrst result states that economic integration between regions in the linear
class which are expectationally stable in isolation and value the product simi-
larly, is expectationally stable. Also for this class, economic integration between
a set of unstable regions and a set of stable ones can end up being stabilizing,
provided that the unstable set is not ’too unstable’ and that its demand elas-
ticity is small relative to the integrated economy’s. Given the distributional
conﬂict created by spatial price stabilization, this is a surprising result. We
would expect coordination to be increasingly diﬃcult with the degree of het-
erogeneity of the system. However, recalling Guesnerie’s [14] insight, it is the
interplay between the magnitude of the reactions (to a given price change) and
their sign what matters. Our second result shows then that spatial diﬀerences in
the valuation of the produced commodity or in price-varying supply and demand
elasticities undermine expectational coordination. Both introduce heterogene-
ity in the magnitude of the responses to the redistributional conﬂict created by
the policy change8. T h i si sw h yo u rﬁrst result does not extend to regions in
the non-linear class even if consumers value the commodity similarly. Intu-
itively, spatial diﬀerences in consumers’ valuations make more likely a type of
’market disruption’ phenomenon which, by excluding low valuation consumers,
only exacerbates the producers’ strategic uncertainty, rendering own forecasts
more dependent on others’ forecasts.
Finally and in consequence, even if an exogenous intervention was unnec-
essary at the autarky level, it becomes compelling because of integration. To
illustrate this fact, we compare the expectational coordination criterion with a
more traditional gains-from-trade criterion from an ex-ante viewpoint. In the
class of one-dimensional linear models considered, the net welfare gain from in-
tegration increases with the degree of spatial heterogeneity9. For given identical
demands across regions, the gains are larger the larger the spatial diﬀerences
in the aggregate costs of production. But as well, the larger the last, the more
spatially dispair the supply responses to a given price change will be, and the
higher the probability of expectational destabilization by economic integration.
T h er e a s o nw ea d o p ta ne x - a n t ev i e w p o i n t( b e f o r ee ﬀective integration takes
8We will show below that expectational coordination is governed by a condition on ﬁrst
derivatives. Then, the magnitude of the reactions to the policy change is measured by changes
in ﬁrst derivatives. This force is absent in the linear class of models without spatial diﬀerences
in consumers’ valuations, explaining the counterintuitive result mentioned above.
9From a classical normative point of view, the partial equilibrium framework is a particular
case of a general equilibrium economy for which Dixit and Norman [6] showed the existence
of ex-post transfers that leave everybody better oﬀ. However, the eﬀective implementation of
these transfers, from an eductive viewpoint, remains an open question because it is likely to
modify the strategic behaviour of producers.
4place) is that the appropriate criterion would necessitate computing producers’
welfare when the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria is not a singleton,
which is beyond the scope of the present work10.
The work proceeds as follows: In section 2, we describe the linear version of
Guesnerie’s [11] model, and his main results relevant to our work. The reader
familiar with his work can directly start in section 3, where we study the eﬀect
of economic integration between regions in the linear class, with and without
spatial diﬀerences in the maximal willingness to pay. In section 4, we extend
the results of section 3 to integrating regions in the non-linear class. In section
5, we compare the expectational coordination criterion to a more traditional
one, which evaluates in welfare terms economic integration from an ex-ante
viewpoint. Finally, in section 6 we conclude.
2 Preliminaries
If one is to recognize that economics is not a natural science because economic
agents make forecasts that inﬂuence the time path of the system, it becomes
crucial to understand how do economic agents form expectations. Faced with
this problem, the modern macroeconomics literature has focused on how do
economic agents ’learn’. A strand of the ’learning’ literature views economic
agents as statisticians who use sophisticated forecasting techniques to estimate
the parameters of the law of motion governing the economic system, and on
the same time taking into account that the use of these techniques shapes the
motion itself. Stated otherwise, available information on the evolution of the
economic system is at best incomplete even to the most sophisticated economic
agent11. The question is then whether the estimated motion would (at least)
asymptotically approximate the motion consistent with agents forming a ratio-
nal expectation. This is called the ’adaptive approach to learning’ (or evolutive
learning) and has a long lasting tradition12.
Ad i ﬀerent strand of the literature upon which we hinge here, is the ’educ-
tive approach to learning’. This second modern approach admits that agents
are rational and know the whole structure of the model describing the evolution
of the system. Nevertheless, agents form expectations that need not coincide:
Bernheim [3] and Pearce [24] show that rationality of the players and complete
information of the game being played, even when they are ’common knowledge’
10Allen, Dutta and Polemarchakis [1] address this problem in generic competitive exchange
economies with countably many competitive equilibria.
11Manski [18] presents two serious reasons in support of the incomplete information work-
horse assumption: empirical data captures the result of choices, and not the expectations of
decision makers when confronted with choices. Second, one cannot expect to recover objective
evidence on expectations because of the selection bias (logical unobservability of counterfac-
tual outcomes). By these reasons, he supports data collection on expectations. Recent work
by Evans and Honkapohja [8] along the lines of adaptive learning, solves the design of optimal
monetary policies when observed data on private agents’ expectations are incorporated in the
policy maker’s optimal monetary rule.
12Evans and Honkapohja [9] summarize this approach and its applications.
5(CK), do not imply the Nash equilibrium outcome but a diﬀerent solution con-
cept called a ’rationalizable equilibrium’ (13). Guesnerie [11] applies the notion
of rationalizability to a version of the standard Muthian model, to show that
CK of rationality and of the model are not enough for them to always coordinate
their expectations on the unique REE solution deﬁn e db yM u t h[ 2 2 ] . I nt h i s
sense, since the deﬁnition of a REE requires expectational coordination14,t h e
eductive approach looks for structural conditions under which isolated indepen-
dent agents’ subjective expectations end up coordinating upon a REE.
In this section we present Guesnerie’s [11] model, its linear version and his
main results relevant to our work. The equilibrium concept will be a ’Rational-
izable Expectations Equilibrium’, as deﬁned in Guesnerie’s [11],[14] works.
2.1 The Model and the Equilibrium Concept
The model describes a two-period partial-competitive equilibrium of an agri-
cultural commodity economy. A continuum of proﬁt maximizing risk-neutral
farmers f ∈ [0,1] with a diﬀerentiable and strictly convex cost function C(q,f)
must decide the quantity q to be produced a period in advance on selling, given
a predictable demand D(p), assumed to be downward sloping D0(p) < 0 and
resulting from the aggregation of a continuum of identical consumers indexed
by c, D(p)=
R
D(p,c)dc. The eﬀective equilibrium price is unknown because it
depends on what other farmers will decide to produce. Therefore, the supply
of each producer will also depend on the probability distribution of the price,
denoted dµ(p) (15). Since farmers are risk neutral, their production decisions
will only depend on the expectation of the price Ep =
R
pdµ(p) :
S[p,dµ(p),f]=( ∂qCf)
−1 [p,dµ(p)] ∈ argmax
q
Z
[pq − C(q,f)]dµ(p)
Putting the Lebesgue measure on [0,1], aggregate supply will be given by:
S[p,dµ(p)] =
Z
S[p,dµ(p),f]df
Under the above assumptions, the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
price p of this model will be given by the equality of aggregate supply and
aggregate demand in expectation, computed using dµ(p,f)=dµ(p),∀f (i.e.
farmers form rational expectations):
p = D−1(S[p,dµ(p)])
13Tan and Werlang [25] transform a non-cooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem
where the uncertainty faced by a given agent is formed by the actions, priors over actions,
priors over priors over actions, etc. of the other agents. They show that common knowledge
of the actual strategies to be played is only necessary for players to play Nash strategies.
14Evans [7] asserts that a REE is in the class of Nash equilibria (in actions and beliefs).
15Strictly speaking, the probability distribution should allow for subjective probabilities
and therefore be written dµ(p,f). However, the only objective diﬀerence across farmers is
the cost function which should not inﬂuence the individual expectation of the market price,
i.e. a farmer with lower costs cannot be reasonably expected to have a more optimistic (or
pessimistic) expectation on the prevailing market price.
6Since there is no noise, the equilibrium p is a Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
(PFE). Therefore, there exists a unique REE (PFE). Following Evans’ [7] asser-
tion according to which a REE is in the class of Nash equilibria in actions and
beliefs (NE), p is also the unique NE16.
Guesnerie [11], following Bernheim [3] and Pearce [24], builds upon the game-
theoretic concept of ’rationalizability’ to deﬁne the ’Rationalizable-Expectations
Equilibria’. These are the limit of an iterative process which views the farmers’
situation as a complete information normal-form game where the set of players is
the set of farmers, and their strategies, the farmers’ individual quantities of the
crop sf ∈ Sf,∀f (17). Each farmer’s payoﬀ function is then his proﬁt function:
½
D−1
µZ
sf0df 0
¶¾
sf − C (sf,f)
For each given proﬁle of strategies of the other farmers (sf0)f0∈[0,1] , the best
response of farmer f is the function that maximizes the above expression. The
concept of a ’rationalizable solution’ R exhausts the implications of individual
rationality and common knowledge (CK) of rationality and of the model when
considered as an iterative process taking place in ’mental time’ τ ( i ne a c ho ft h e
farmers’ heads) following which non-best response strategies are progressively
eliminated18. Where does this iterative process start? It starts at an initial
restriction (τ =0 ) on the players’ strategy sets called anchorage assumption,
which is either naturally embedded on the model at stark or exogenously given19.
In either case, it is also CK. This iterative process of elimination of non-best
responses will lead somewhere, deﬁned by Pearce [24] and Bernheim [3] as a
rationalizable solution R :
R =( sf0)f0 ∈
Y
f0 (∩∞
τ=0S(τ,f0))
Whenever the sets of best response strategies S(τ,f) shrink through ’mental
time’ τ to a singleton, farmers instantaneously coordinate on a unique (pro-
duction) strategy. Because of the one-to-one correspondence between prices
16For an explicit formulation of this assertion in the class of models under consideration,
see Desgranges and Gauthier [5].
17At this stage, it is important to understand that since the supply function is a one-
to-one correspondence of the expected prevailing market price, as Guesnerie [11] points out
(p.1258), the strategies are also the individual price expectations. For an exposition using
price expectations, see Desgranges and Gauthier [5].
18Observe that a CK assumption is absolutely rational in a strategic context: when an
individual recognizes that self-interest depends on others’ actions, his conjectures on their
likely behaviour are essential to the eﬀective consecution of self intentions. The conjectures
are the subjective expectations that each agent forms independently of others. But if one is
to form conjectures about others’ behaviour, it seems natural to recognize that others form
conjectures as well in the same way as one does. Then the agent must conjecture about
others’ actions and conjectures. This process can go several steps further, triggered by the
CK behavioural assumption.
19At this stage, it is to be understood not as an exogenous intervention, but as a robustness
test that any REE should pass for it to be ’implementable’ through the iterative process
of learning that is being described. If the REE fails to pass the test, then exogenous price
restrictions (more or less severe) can be introduced by an exogenous third party, to achieve
coordination. See Guesnerie [14] for further details.
7and quantities, that production decision will correspond to a price expectation.
As market clearing is CK, that price expectation must clear the market, and
therefore coincide with the actual equilibrium price. As that equilibrium price
is the unique rationalizable solution, and because the Nash solution is always
rationalizable, the equilibrium price must coincide with the Nash equilibrium
of the normal-form game. However, when the sets of farmers’ best responses
do not collapse to a singleton, full coordination is not achieved. Although the
Nash equilibrium will be included in, farmers equivalently consider each of the
possible rationalizable strategies as an equilibrium production decision, corre-
sponding each to an equilibrium price expectation20.
Guesnerie [11] otains structural conditions under which, without assuming
that farmers held rational expectations, the Rationalizable Expectations Equilib-
rium of the farmers’ normal-form game described above coincides with the REE
(or NE). The unique Rationalizable Expectations Equilibrium is called by him a
’Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibrium’ (SREE) or ’unique rationalizable
expectations equilibrium’.
2.2 The Linear Speciﬁcation
Consider the (non-noisy) linear version of the model presented above. The
demand function for the crop is given by:
D(p)=
½
A − Bp if 0 ≤ p ≤ A
B ≡ p0
0 otherwise
and C(q,f)=
q2
2Cf ,f ∈ [0,1] constitutes the farmers’ cost function. Under this
linear speciﬁcation, the PFE price is given by21:
p =
A
B + C
: C ≡
Z
Cfdf
The game that farmers play has a set of rationalizable strategies given by the
limit of the iterative process of elimination of non-best responses from the strat-
egy sets of farmers that we describe. The iteration is triggered by the CK of
individual rationality and of the model, since the anchorage assumption is em-
bedded in the structure of the model: at virtual time τ =0each farmer f
recognizes that equilibrium prices cannot be negative nor larger than p0 ≡ A
B
20It is important to stress that to compute the rationalizable equilibrium, the subjective
price probability distribution and the cost function of every agent as well as market clearing are
CK in the model considered. The work by Desgranges and Gauthier [5] makes clear the distinc-
tion between strategic uncertainty and model uncertainty in the linear noisy one-dimensional
version of Guesnerie [11] presented here: they show that whenever the CK assumption on
farmers’ subjective probability beliefs is violated, the success of the iterative process is com-
promised. Intuitively, when the subjective probability beliefs are not CK, farmers play an
incomplete information game.
21It can be checked that with the encompassing deﬁnition of the demand function D(p)=
max{A − Bp,0}, with p0 ≡ minD−1(0) = A
B, t h eP F Ep r i c ee q u a l sp0 when total supply is
zero.
8since D(p0)=0 , deﬁning the maximum willingness to pay. Therefore each
farmer deletes from his strategy set any quantity of the crop sf ≥ S(p0,f)
deﬁning the set S(0,f)=[ 0 ,S(p0,f)],∀f. At τ =1since each farmer knows
that other farmers are rational as well, each farmer knows that other farmers
∀f0 6= f will play strategies in their sets S(0,f0). Therefore, total supply cannot
be greater than S(p0)=
R
S(p0,f0)df 0, which from the market clearing equa-
tion being common knowledge, each farmer deduces that the equilibrium price
cannot be smaller than p1 = D−1 [S(p0)] and proceeds to delete from his strat-
egy set S(0,f) all these quantities that are smaller than sf ≤ S(p1,f). This
deﬁnes the new set of strategies S(1,f)=[ S(p1,f),S(p0,f)] for every farmer
f. Now at τ =2each farmer recognizes that the other farmers ∀f0 6= f know
what he knows, and therefore play also strategies in the set S(1,f0)... and so
on. Intuitively, each step τ corresponds to a further logical deduction step pro-
gressively exhausting the implications of the CK behavioural assumption and
of the initial anchorage restriction triggering it. This process leads each farmer
to individually reproduce in their heads the following sequence of (expected)
prices (pτ)
∞
τ=0:
p1 = D−1 [S(p0)] =
A
B
−
C
B
p0
p2 =
A
B
−
C
B
p1 =
A
B
∙
1+
µ
−
C
B
¶¸
+
µ
−
C
B
¶2
p0
...
pτ =
A
B
−
C
B
pτ−1 =
A
B
"
m=τ−1 X
m=0
µ
−
C
B
¶m#
+
µ
−
C
B
¶τ
p0
If this sequence has a limit, from the rationalizable solution concept, it must be
the Nash equilibrium of the game p. We reproduce Guesnerie’s [11] proposition
1, which establishes conditions under which farmers are able to coordinate on
the PFE price p. Under those conditions the equilibrium is a SREE:
Proposition 1 (Guesnerie, [11]) (i) B>C⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) B ≤
C ⇐⇒ p is not an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equi-
libria comprises the segment [0,p 0]
The conclusion of proposition 1 can be read as ’a low elasticity of aggregate
supply (small C) and a high elasticity of demand (large B) favour expectational
coordination from an eductive viewpoint’. Intuitively, it can be read also as
’producers’ forecasts are more reliable the lower the sensibility of their decisions
to others’ forecasts’. Then under condition (i), the set of farmers’ rationalizable
strategies that are the rationalizable solution R of the farmers’ game is:
R =( sf0)f0 ∈
Y
f0 (∩∞
τ=0S(τ,f0)) =
Y
f0 S(∞,f0)=( S(p,f0))f0
If however condition (ii) is satisﬁed, then the price sequence (pτ)
∞
τ=0 does not
have a limit and the set of farmers’ rationalizable strategies that are a rational-
9izable solution R of the farmers’ game is:
R =( sf0)f0 ∈
Y
f0 (∩∞
τ=0S(τ,f0)) =
Y
f0 S(0,f0)=×
f0 [0,S(p0,f0)]
In situations like (ii), Guesnerie [11] identiﬁes the minimal set of conditions
suﬃcient to achieve full coordination, calling them ’credible price restrictions’
or ’exogenous price interventions’, imp l e m e n t e db ya ne x o g e n o u st h i r dp a r t y .
In this particular example, the model deﬁnition embeds the initial anchorage
assumption. Furthermore, it is not ’close’ to the equilibrium outcome. Then,
under the (i) condition, the equilibrium price is ’Globally SR’. In general, when
no such natural embedding exists, the anchorage assumption is exogenously
speciﬁed. When the model considered is non-linear, the anchorage assumption
is settled ’close’ to the REE under scrutiny and the analysis is local (because
there might exist multiple equilibria, which we assume locally determinate).
Then, when the iterative process converges, the equilibrium is called ’Locally
SR’ or ’SR with respect to the CK anchorage assumption’. When the itera-
tive process does not converge, the ’credible price restrictions’ or ’exogenous
price interventions’ qualify the above deﬁnitions to be ’SR with respect to these
restrictions’. For non-linear versions of the economy under study, the iterative
process describing farmers’ eductive learning can be characterized by the second
iterate of the cobweb function ϕ(.) ≡ D−1 [S(.)],ϕ 2(.) ≡ ϕ[ϕ(.)], conditional
to the CK initial restriction22,d e n o t e dV (p):
Proposition 2 (Guesnerie [11]):
(i) If |ϕ0(p)| < 1 ⇔ S0(p) < |D0 [S(p)]|,∀p and if there is a credible price
restriction (ﬂo o ro rc e i l i n g ) ,t h e np is a SREE subject to the given price restric-
tion.
(ii) If |ϕ0(p)| < 1, there is a credible price restriction (ﬂoor or ceiling) s.t. p
is a SREE subject to the given price restriction.
(iii) If |ϕ0(p)| > 1, and if the graph of ϕ2(.) intersects transversely the 45-
degree line more than once, then there is a credible price restriction (ﬂoor or
ceiling) s.t.[pc1,p c2] is the set of rationalizable-expectations equilibrium prices
subject to the given price restriction, where pc2 = ϕ(pc1),ϕ 2(pct)=pct,t=1 ,2
deﬁne cycles of order two of the cobweb function (23),(24).
The results in section 3 will provide examples of each of these cases.
22Subject to the condition that lim
τ→∞
¡
ϕ2¢τ (p0) = lim
τ→∞ϕ2τ(p0)=p, p0 ∈ V (p)
23For a proof of the general statement which includes cases (ii) of proposition 1 and this
case (iii), see Bernheim [3], proposition 5.2., part (a).
24This is trivially true if [pc1,p c2] ⊂ V (p). If however V (p) ⊆ [pc1,p c2], the learning
dynamics will also converge to the set [pc1,p c2], but, as discussed by Guesnerie [14], the CK
anchorage assumption must then be understood not as a ’hypothetical’ restriction, but as
resulting from a non-enforceable ’exogenous price intervention’.
103 Integration of Linear Economies
Most of the international trade literature concerns comparative statics excer-
cises on the eﬀect of changes in the production structure (factor endowments or
production techniques) on the equilibrium outcome operated via the mobility
of commodities or factors. The consequences on factors and commodity prices
are corollaries of the comparative statics exercise under the same or alternative
restrictions. However, they all necessitate at least two commodities for the ex-
change channel to operate. In the class of agricultural economies considered,
there is only a single homogenoeus crop produced at diﬀerent costs depend-
ing on farmers’ technologies. From the expectational stability viewpoint, the
open economy device introduces heterogeneity in the autarkic economy, which
according to Guesnerie’s [14] general intuition (GI2), should undermine its ex-
pectational stability. A related way to understand the exercise is to assume
that non-increasing returns to scale producers play a large oligopoly game with
strategic substituabilities, the equilibrium of which is globally perturbed by the
integration policy. The question would then be whether the dominance solv-
ability of the autarkic equilibrium is robust to the introduction of heterogeneity
(amenable to an open economy device)25.
Although the answer will be related to the factors favouring coordination
upon the integrating regions autarkic equilibrium (propositions 1,2 above), the
answer is not immediate. From the comparative statics excercises of partial
equilibrium, we know that aggregating demand curves results in a more elastic
demand curve. According to proposition 1, a higher demand elasticity favours
expectational coordination. However, and by the same reason, aggregation of
supply curves is detrimental to eductive coordination. As economic integration
entails both, it does not necessarily undermine the coordinational ability of
farmers. Actually, mere replication of the Home economy will not aﬀect its
degree of expectational stability.
To see it, consider the linear class of agricultural economies indexed by
n ∈ N = {1...N} characterized by a set of risk neutral farmers fn ∈ [0,1] living
in region n with strictly convex cost structures C(sfn,f n,n)=
(sfn)
2
2Cfn(n) facing a
(weakly) decreasing demand function Dn(p) ≡
R
Dn(p,cn)dcn =m a x{An − Bnp,0}
arising from a continuum of individual consumers living in that region26. Sup-
pose that the N economies in the linear class are identical and decide to inte-
grate (ﬁx n = n0,∀n and call economy n0 the Home economy). The aggregate
supply of such a global agricultural economy will be given by the sum of the
aggregate supply functions of each of the N regions, S(p)=
PN
n=1 Sn(p)=
N
R
Cfn0(n0)pdfn0 = NSn0(p). So will the aggregate demand: D(p)=
PN
n=1 Dn(p)=
NDn0(p). Substituting these deﬁnitions in proposition 1 above, we can imme-
diately observe that the PFE-price is given by:
p = pn0 =
An0
Bn0 + Cn0
25See Vives [26] ch.4.4. for a synthetic presentation of large Cournot markets.
26Throughout we assume that An,B n > 0, ∀n ∈ N. Notice that p0 ≡ minD−1
n (0) = An
Bn .
11Then, the conditions under which farmers will be able to individually predict
the PFE-price p coincide with those of proposition 1:
Proposition 3 (i) Bn0 >C n0 ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) Bn0 ≤ Cn0 ⇐⇒ p is not
an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria comprises
the segment [0,p 0].
A perhaps more interesting result is that this proposition extends to the
integration of N identical non-linear agricultural economies27. However, when
considered in isolation, the eﬀect of increasing the number of farmers facing
a given aggregate demand curve is detrimental to the eductive stability of the
equilibrium28. Consider our Home economy n = n0. Suppose that in addition
to the Home farmers, those from the rest of the regions N\{n0} can also sell
in the Home crop market. Denote by CΣ = Cn0 +
P
n6=n0 Cn the aggregate
cost parameter characterizing the total supply of the crop. The PFE price is
p =
An0
Bn0+CΣ, which when:
Proposition 4 (i) Bn0 >C Σ ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) Bn0 ≤ CΣ ⇐⇒ p is not
an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria comprises
the segment [0,p 0]. (iii) Increasing the number of farmers is detrimental to
expectational stability.
Proof. Compute the limit lim
τ→+∞pτ of the price sequence:
pτ =
An0
Bn0
⎡
⎣
1 −
³
− CΣ
Bn0
´τ
1 −
³
− CΣ
Bn0
´
⎤
⎦ +
µ
−
CΣ
Bn0
¶τ
p0
Part (iii) follows trivially from the deﬁnition of CΣ, (i) and noting that repli-
cating the supply side of the Home economy makes CΣ = NCn0.
Part (iii) states that the set of rationalizable solutions of the Home economy
Rn0 will strictly include the set of rationalizable solutions of the global agri-
cultural economy R of proposition 3: Rn0 ⊃ R. As the aggregation of supply
curves increases the elasticity of the resulting aggregate supply schedule, each
farmer’s quantity choice becomes more sensible to other farmers’ choices, ren-
dering their predictions of the market clearing price less accurate. Intuitively, as
new entrants gain access to the Home market, the relative scarcity of the home
produced commodity decreases, intensifying competition and lowering the price
and proﬁts of home producers, compelling their forecasts to increasingly rely on
the strategic component of what do others expect, so undermining expectational
coordination29. Therefore, opening the Home market to Foreign competitors is
27See the next section.
28As Vives [26] discusses for large Cournot games, the eﬀect parallels adverse impact on
dominance solvability of the equilibrium from increasing the number of producers without
replicating the demand.
29Notice that the proposition is silent about the relative eﬃciency of the new foreign en-
trants: actually they can even produce at higher real costs (in terms of Home purchasing
power, as we abstract from aggregate demand changes). Therefore, it is related to a pure
scarcity eﬀect relative to autarky, that exists because entry is exogenous.
12destabilizing, in the precise sense of producers’ undermined ability to forecast
the market clearing price30.
Replication of the Home demand without replicating the supply side shows
the beneﬁcial role of the demand elasticity on the expectational stability of the
resulting PFE price, given now by p =
NAn0
NBn0+Cn0 . Then when:
Proposition 5 (i) NBn0 >C n0 ⇐⇒ p is an SREE. (ii) NBn0 ≤ Cn0 ⇐⇒
p is not an SREE, and the set of rationalizable-expectations price equilibria
comprises the segment [0,p 0]. (iii) Increasing the number of consumers favours
stability.
Proof. For parts (i),(ii) compute the limit lim
τ→+∞pτ of the price sequence
in the previous proposition after replacing
³
− CΣ
Bn0
´
by
³
−
Cn0
NBn0
´
. Part (iii)
follows from (i) and NBn0 >B n0.
Intuitively, part (iii) states that as the number of consumers increases, the
demand becomes more sensible to price changes because the relative scarcity
of the home produced commodity increases. Then, higher prices and proﬁts
are expected relative to autarky, relaxing home competition and reducing the
weight of the strategic component in producers’ forecasts (forecasting others’
forecasts), which favours expectational coordination. Therefore, opening new
markets for the Home producers is stabilizing, in the precise sense that produc-
ers’ expectations become more reliable31.
Notice that this proposition is not the exact analogue of proposition 4.
However, deﬁning D(p)=m a x {
P
n(An − Bnp),0} ≡ max{AΣ − BΣp,0} and
imposing the additional condition An
Bn =
An0
Bn0 ,∀n,n0 ∈ N the exact analogue
obtains. This additional condition imposes the equality of the maximal will-
ingnesses to pay for the crop across regions, i.e. some ’homogeneization’ of
consumers’ valuation of the produced commodity. Its role on the expectational
stability of the equilibrium price is the subject of the next two subsections.
3.1 From Global to Local Stability Conditions
In the class of linear economies considered, the anchorage assumption is embed-
ded in the model and it is unnecessary to specify it exogenously. Furthermore,
the autarkic expectational stability test of the PFE price is ’global’ in the sense
that the anchorage assumption is not ’close’ to the equilibrium. The same is
true for the PFE price of the integrated economy, provided that the consumers
of diﬀerent regions value the crop ’similarly’, i.e. provided that consumers’
maximal willingness to pay is identical across regions: An
Bn =
An0
Bn0 ,∀n,n0 ∈ N.
30However, this proposition does not generalize to general non-linear schedules. In the next
section we provide an example where increasing the number of producers stabilizes expecta-
tions.
31This proposition does neither extend to general non-linear schedules. In the next section
we give an example where increasing the number of consumers destabilizes expectations.
13With the same notation as previously, we deﬁne the regional integration
demand and supply by D(p)=m a x {AΣ − BΣp,0},S (p)=CΣp.T h e P F E
price of the regional integration of N economies in the linear class is:
D(p)=S(p) ⇐⇒ p =
AΣ
BΣ + CΣ
and will be expectationally stable when:
Proposition 6 Suppose that An
Bn =
An0
Bn0 ,∀n,n0 ∈ N. Then: (i) BΣ >C Σ ⇐⇒ p
is an SREE. (ii) BΣ ≤ CΣ ⇐⇒ p i sn o ta nS R E E ,a n dt h es e to fr a t i o n a l i z a b l e -
expectations price equilibria comprises the segment [0,p 0]:p0 = AΣ
BΣ. (iii) The
regional integration of N autarkically expectationally stable economies is expec-
tationally stable, but the converse is false.
Proof. See appendix 0.
Intuitively, part (iii) states that it is not regional integration per se what
undermines expectational coordination, but the integration with expectationally
unstable regions. And even then, if the set of stable economies is suﬃciently
stable, economic integration can favour expectational coordination.T h i s i s a
surprising conclusion in light of Guesnerie’s [14] general intuition (GI2), which
states that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational coordination32.
Actually, if we remove the condition imposing equal maximal willingnesses
to pay for the crop across regions, the regional integration demand becomes
non-linear (piece-wise linear) and the results of propositon 1 above do not apply
anymore. We have to resort to a local analysis of expectational stability, but as
in this model the anchorage assumption is naturally embedded in the deﬁnition
and not necessarily ’close’ to the PFE, we are in the class of situations described
by Guesnerie [14], case I.2.(i).
To exemplify it, suppose that we applied the ’expectational stability test’
of the above proposition (CΣ
BΣ < 1) to the regional integration of two economies
n = {1,2} in the linear class N,s u c ht h a tA2
B2 ≥ A1
B1. Two kinds of misleading
conclusions are likely to emerge, respectively depicted in ﬁgures 1 and 2 below:
D,S
p
p0
C1+C2
C1
C2
A1+ A2
A1
A2
A1/ B1 A2/ B2
Figure 1 D,S
p
C1+C2
C1
C2
A1+ A2
A1
A2
p0 =A1/ B1 A2/ B2
Figure 2
p
32The next section qualiﬁes this conclusion.
14In ﬁgure 1 the (global) ’expectational stability test’ fails and nevertheless the
PFE price is (locally) expectationally stable. Notice that in addition, the two
regions are autarkically expectationally stable. In ﬁgure 2, the (global) ’expecta-
tional stability test’ is passed, although the PFE price is (locally) expectationally
unstable. What is even more striking is that both regions are expectationally
stable in autarky33. In the next subsection we fully develop a two-region exam-
ple and extend proposition 6 to the case where condition An
Bn =
An0
Bn0 ,∀n,n0 ∈ N
does not hold.
3.2 Structural Heterogeneity
I nt h i ss u b s e c t i o nw es t u d yt h ee d u c t i v es t a b i l i t yo ft h eP F Ep r i c ew h e nd i f -
ferences in the maximal willingnesses to pay across regions in the linear class
are allowed for34. These diﬀerences render piece-wise linear the cobweb charac-
terization of the eductive learning process (with respect to the autarkic cobweb
function, which is linear) with two main consequences: First, from the compari-
son of Guesnerie’s [11] propositions 1 and 2, the necessity of an ’exogenous price
intervention’ is more stringent if expectational coordination is to be maintained
at the global level. This is reminiscent of the traditional need to coordinate
regional social planners at the open economy level to fulﬁl pre-trade national
goals, and it can be then understood as a new ’rationale’ justifying an exoge-
nous intervention after integration35. Second, and in consequence, the study of
its convergence must be local, in the sense that the CK anchorage assumption
must be settled ’close’ to the PFE price. The problem is that the deﬁnition of
the regionally integrated model already embeds an anchorage assumption which
is not ’close’, leading in some cases to the type of inconsistencies adduced by
Guesnerie’s [14] case I.2.(i). To give a precise content to these statements, we
present a simple two-region integration exercise. Then we extend proposition 6
to accomodate spatial diﬀerences in consumers’ valuations.
3.2.1 A Robust Example
Consider the regional integration of two economies n = {1,2} in the linear class
N, such that A2
B2 ≥ A1
B1. Accordingly, and from the deﬁnition of regional demands,
pn
0 ≡ minD−1
n (0) = An
Bn,n=1 ,2. Keeping the same notation, after integration
farmers’ demand will be D(p)=
P
n Dn(p)1{p≤pn
0}, where 1{p≤pn
0} denotes the
standard indicator function, taking value 1 only if the n-region consumers can
aﬀo r dt ob u yt h ec r o pa tp r i c ep, and zero otherwise36. Then, the PFE price p
33But also more intuitive, in the sense that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational
coordination.
34We will assume throughout that the region with a relatively more elastic demand will
have the lower maximal willigness to pay for the crop. This assumption can be dispensed
with and the conclusions still hold.
35The precise instruments, or the study of their eﬀective implementation, are left for future
work.
36In this particular example, we can alternatively characterize the demand function as
D(p)=m a x{AΣ − BΣp,A2 − B2p,0}.
15will be given by:
p =m a x
½
AΣ
BΣ + CΣ
,
A2
B2 + CΣ
¾
The PFE price is represented in ﬁgure 3 below37 as a function of the aggregate
supply cost parameter CΣ, p(CΣ). We have parameterized the diﬀerence in the
maximal willingnesses to pay by CΣ = A2
h
B1
A1 − B2
A2
i
. We can see that the PFE
price changes for values of the aggregate supply cost parameter above and below
CΣ. Values of CΣ above CΣ indicate that both regional markets will be served
after integration, whereas values below indicate that only the highest valuation
region will be served (n =2 , given our assumptions). The case where CΣ =0
corresponds to the equality of maximal willingnesses to pay of proposition 6
-only values above CΣ are allowed-.
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The learning dynamics of the regional integration PFE price are characterized
by the piece-wise linear cobweb function ϕ(p) ≡ D−1 [S(p)], with the following
analytic form38:
ϕ(p;CΣ)=m a x
©
ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ),ϕ 2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ)
ª
=
½
ϕ2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ) if p ≤ pi
ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ) if p ≥ pi
Where ϕ1(p;CΣ ≥ CΣ)=AΣ
BΣ − CΣ
BΣp coincides with the linear cobweb function of
characterizing the learning dynamics when the condition A1
B1 = A2
B2 ⇐⇒ CΣ =0
is satisﬁed, while ϕ2(p;CΣ ≤ CΣ)=A2
B2 − CΣ
B2 p c o r r e s p o n d st ot h ec a s ei n
which A2
B2 ≥ A1
B1 and CΣ ≤ CΣ. Therefore, when A2
B2 ≥ A1
B1 but CΣ ≥ CΣ, the
conclusions of proposition 6 apply even with diﬀerent maximal valuations across
37Recall that we assumed throughout A1 ≥ ... ≥ AN > 0 and B1 ≥ ... ≥ BN > 0. Then
when n = {1,2}, min
n An = A2 and min
n Bn = B2.
38In appendix 1 it is shown that ϕ0(.) ≤ 0 and that ϕ(p)=p. These are general properties
of the cobweb function in the class of economies under study.
16regions. pi is the price at which both functions ϕ1(.),ϕ 2(.) intersect (39). In
ﬁgure 4 above, we have depicted the cobweb function ϕ(.) when A2
B2 ≥ A1
B1 and
CΣ ≤ CΣ : then only region 2 consumers will be able to aﬀord the consumption
of the crop at the prevailing PFE price p. Also notice that the conclusions of
proposition 6 do not hold: the global ’expectational stability test’ is satisﬁed,
but the PFE price is (locally) expectationally unstable. When the economy
under study is non-linear, proposition 2 above provides conclusions on the basis
of the second iterate of the cobweb function ϕ2(.), given by40:
ϕ2(p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi
inf
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)1{pi
inf=pi} +( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)1{pi
inf=pi0} if p ∈
¡
pi
inf,p i
sup
¢
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi
sup
Where pi0 denotes a second intersecting price41 satisfying ϕ1
£
ϕ(pi0)
¤
= ϕ2
£
ϕ(pi0)
¤
.
We deﬁne42 pi
inf =m a x
©
min
©
pi0,p iª
,p 0
1
ª
and pi
sup =m i n
©
max
©
pi0,p iª
,p ∞
ª
,
which constitute the two non-diﬀerentiability points of the piece-wise linear func-
tion ϕ2(.). Finally 1{pi
inf=pi} takes value 1 if pi
inf = pi and 0 otherwise. To gain
some intuition on its shape, ﬁgure 5 depicts the second iterate of the cobweb
function corresponding to the parameterization of ﬁgure 4 -the cobweb ϕ(.) and
its second iterate ϕ2(.) are superposedly depicted to facilitate the comparison-:
1
1
B
A
p CΣ
p CΣ
C1
C2
A1
A2
Figure 5
2 , , , ϕ ϕ D S
p
A1 + A2
2
2
B
A 2 c p p 1 c p 0 p′
39For the derivation of the cobweb function and the expression of the intersection price, see
appendix 1.
40Notice that the learning dynamics characterized by it adopt the form of a functional
piece-wise linear diﬀerence equation. See appendix 2 for the derivation, and appendix 3 for
its properties.
41See appendix 2 for its derivation, explicit formulation and properties 1-5.
42See observation 2 of appendix 2 for the deﬁnitions of p0
1,p ∞ the interest of which is merely
technical.
17Observe that the second iterate of the cobweb function is monotonically increas-
ing, that it satisﬁes ϕ2(p)=ϕ[ϕ(p)] = ϕ(p)=p, and that for the particular
parameterization represented in ﬁgures 4 and 5, the two non-diﬀerentiability
points are given by pi0 >p i =m i n
n
An
Bn = A1
B1. In ﬁgure 5, the two main con-
sequences adduced can be illustrated: First, even if both regions were expec-
tationally stable before integration (check ﬁgure 4), the resulting PFE price is
’expectationally unstable’ after integration. This is in line with the intuition
that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational coordination, qualifying the
conclusions of proposition 6 above. Second, the embedded anchorage assump-
tion p0 =m a x
n
An
Bn = A2
B2 is not ’local’. Conditional on that ’initial price restric-
tion’ p0, the learning process converges but not to the PFE p. It converges to
pc2, b e l o n g i n gt ot h es e t[pc1,p c2] of rationalizable-expectations equilibria, con-
taining p. If the ’local’ approach had been adopted, the initial price restriction,
denoted p0
0 in the picture, would have rather been set in a neighbourhood of
the PFE, N (p)=( p −  ,p +  ). Then the learning dynamics depicted in ﬁgure
5 would diverge, but not forever: the process stops at [pc1,p c2]. This provides
an illustration of Guesnerie [14], case I.2.(i). To avoid the type of inconsistency
adduced, he suggests to pick p0 outside the set of rationalizable prices [pc1,p c2],
but ’close’ to it.
Then, the most salient result is:
Proposition 7 Set N ={1,2}. If CΣ ≥ CΣ the results of proposition 6 extend
t ot h ec a s ew h e r e∃n,n0 ∈ N :An
Bn 6=
An0
Bn0 . If however CΣ < CΣ then even if both
economies were autarkically expectationally stable, the global equilibrium price
can end up being unstable.
Proof. (See the results in Table A4.1 in appendix 4 and the corresponding
proofs)
Intuitively, a large disparity in consumers’ regional valuations renders farm-
ers’ forecasts increasingly unreliable because it renders a ’market disruption’
phenomenon more likely: If as a result of regional integration the PFE price is
’too high’, the consumers from the low-valuation region will be excluded (’mar-
ket disruption’) with the adverse net eﬀect of a pure increase in the number of
farmers’ competitors, studied in proposition 4.
The next proposition generalizes this result to the regional integration of
N economies in the linear class, such that ∃n,n0 ∈ N :An
Bn 6=
An0
Bn0 . From the
discussion of the previous example, we adopt a ’local’ approach of convergence
of the learning dynamics. Proposition 2 characterizes the local eductive stability
condition, which can be rewritten as:
ϕ0(p)=κ{n:p≤pn
0}
"
X
n
D0
n(p)
P
n D0
n(p)
ϕ0
n(p)
#
= κ{n:p≤pn
0}
"
X
n
αnϕ0
n (pn)
#
18The second equality follows from linearity, ϕ0
n (p)=ϕ0
n (pn),∀n. The factor
κ{n:p≤pn
0} captures the possibility of spatial diﬀerences in the maximal willing-
nesses to pay, and is deﬁned as:
κ{n:p≤pn
0} ≡
P
n D0
n(p)
P
n:p≤pn
0 D0
n(p)
≥ 1
with
P
n:p≤pn
0 D0
n(p)=
P
n D0
n(p)1{p≤pn
0}, from taking the price derivative of
the regionally integrated demand function. The denominator sums the regional
demand elasticities at the open economy equilibrium price, whenever the quan-
tities demanded are positive. The numerator sums the regional demand elastic-
ities irrespectively of whether open economy equilibrium quantities are positive
or not43. Finally, whenever the consumers of all the integrating regions can
aﬀord consumption at the free-trade equilibrium price, the numerator and the
denominator of the above expression coincide and κ{n:p≤pn
0} =1 . Whenever it
is not the case, κ{n:p≤pn
0} > 1. Then:
Proposition 8 For N ={1,...,N}, if ∃n,n0 ∈ N :An
Bn 6=
An0
Bn0 , then the regional
integration of autarkic expectationally stable economies can be expectationally
unstable. It is more likely so, the larger the disparity in the willingnesses to pay
across regions.
Proof. See appendix 5.
In the next section, we extend the conclusions obtained for the linear class
of economies N, to the non-linear class of economies M.
4 Integration of Non-linear Economies
In this section, we explore the robustness of the conclusions of the previous
section when the integrating regions are in the non-linear class M ={1,...,M}.
The following condition guarantees that, with the appropriate boundary behav-
iour, the equilibria are unique (both autarkic and regionally integrated) and
therefore (globally) determinate:
Condition (A.1.): ∀p ∈ [0,p m
0 ),D 0
m(p) < 0,S 0
m(p) > 0; pm
0 ≡ min(Dm)
−1 (0) >
0; Sm(0) = 0; Dm(.),S m(.) ∈ C1; ∀m ∈ M.
Notice that (A.1.) does not restrict the second derivatives of the supply and
demand schedules, and also that S0
m(.) > 0 implies that the underlying regional
costs are convex.
Uniqueness of the regionally integrated PFE price p then follows from (A.1.),
from appropriate boundary conditions44 and from the cobweb function being
43Actually, this is just a useful ’trick’ that simpliﬁes the proofs and allows an enlightening
comparison with the results of proposition 6 above.
44The boundary conditions are:
P
m [Dm(0) − Sm(0)] > 0, and, for a small ε>0:
P
m
h
Dm
³
max
m
pm
0 − ε
´
− Sm
³
max
m
pm
0 − ε
´i
< 0
19decreasing in the relevant price domain:
ϕ0 (p)=
P
m S0
m (p)
P
m:p≤pm
0 D0
m (p)
< 0,∀p ∈ [0,max
m pm
0 − ε]
To avoid the type of inconsistencies discussed in the previous section, we
adopt a ’local eductive viewpoint’, choosing a CK initial price restriction ’close’
to the PFE price (in a neighbourhood around it), p0 ∈ N (p)=( p −  ,p +  ).
Whenever the learning process converges to it, we will say that the equilibrium
is (locally) strongly rational (LSR). Since p is locally determinate, applying the
implicit function theorem to the market clearing equation D(p)=S(p), we
obtain the following condition characterizing the learning dynamics:
lim
τ→∞(pτ − p)=
µ
S0(p)
D0(p)
¶τ
(p0 − p)=0⇔ |ϕ0 (p)| =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
S0(p)
D0(p)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1
According to the result (ii) of proposition 2 above. Since our purpose is to
relate the condition for the expectational stability of the regionally integrated
equilibrium to the autarkic stability ones, we can expand it as:
ϕ0 (p)=
P
m S0
m (p)
P
m:p≤pm
0 D0
m (p)
= κ{m:p≤pm
0 }
X
m
αm
D0
m (pm)
D0
m (p)
S0
m (p)
S0
m (pm)
ϕ0
m (pm)
Where the αm ≥ 0,∀m :
P
m αm =1represent the relative (to the world)
demand elasticities of each of the integrating economies evaluated at the PFE
price p. The autarky PFE price of each m region is denoted pm.T h e f a c t o r
κ{m:p≤pm
0 } ≡
P
m D0
m(p) P
m:p≤pm
0
D0
m(p) has exactly the same interpretation as in the linear
case: it accounts for diﬀerences in the maximal willingnesses to pay across the
integrating regions, now in the non-linear class.
The ﬁrst result extends proposition 3 to non-linear economies:
Proposition 9 The expectational stability of the M-replica Home economy in
the non-linear class M obtains under the same conditions it does in the Home
non-linear economy.
Proof. See appendix 5.
The importance of this proposition stems in recognizing that it is not non-
linearities per se that matter, but heterogeneity. Being it absent, the M replica
of the Home economy does not even create a redistributional conﬂict among
producers, because the open economy price coincides with the autarkic one.
However, the conclusions of propositions 4 and 5 do not extend to the non-
linear class. Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate, respectively, the reasons of such
failures. In ﬁgure 6, as new producers enter the Home market, the equilibrium
price decreases at a higher rate than entry does, because the elasticity of demand
increases more than proportionately (price-varying elasticity). Then, opening
20the Home market to Foreign producers may end up stabilizing expectations45.
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In ﬁgure 7, as the Home producers pregressively sell in Foreign markets, the
eﬀective demand they face increases and so will the equilibrium price. But if
higher sales entail progressively lower marginal costs, the supply elasticity may
considerably increase and the new price equilibrium becomes expectationally
unstable. Then, new markets may actually destabilize expectations. The con-
vexity of aggregate supply in picture 7 implies that marginal costs increase at
a decreasing rate with units produced. This is rather unintuitive in this model
with no sunk costs. Rather, if we assume that marginal costs increase at an in-
creasing rate (ex. because of the decreasing returns to some ﬁxed factor in the
short run) the supply locii will be concave and new markets stabilize producers’
expectations.
Both propositions, 4 and 5, fail to generalize because the comparative statics
excercise ultimately depends on the magnitude of the response of farmers’ re-
actions to structural changes, like an increase in foreign competition, or having
access to new markets. That magnitude is governed by the second derivative of
the supply (and demand) schedule(s). Requiring (supply and) demand sched-
ules to be concave, and with equal marginal willingnesses to pay (pm
0 = p0,
∀m ∈ M), allows a straightforward generalization to non-linear schedules of
both propositions:
Proposition 10 Suppose that in addition to condition (A.1.), D00
m(.) < 0,S00
m(.) <
0, and pm
0 = p0, ∀m ∈ M. Then: (i) Proposition 4 extends to the non-linear
class, (ii) Proposition 5 extends to the non-linear class.
Proof. See appendix 5.
45The problem is connected to the convexity of demand, which in usual Cournot games, pre-
vents the players’ reaction functions from being downward sloping, or, players’ strategies from
being strategic substitutes. See Vives [26], chapters 2 and 4 for a comprehensive explanation.
21Intuitively the proposition states that, whenever both demand and supply
schedules are (globally) concave, opening new markets favours expectational co-
ordination whereas opening the Home market to Foreign competitors is detri-
mental, even for integrating regions in the non-linear class M.
If we extend proposition 6 to the non-linear class of economies, our main
result states that:
Proposition 11 If there are no diﬀerences in the maximal willingnesses to pay
across regions, then the regional integration of M autarkic expectationally stable
economies can result in an expectationally unstable PFE price.
Proof. See appendix 5.
This result is striking because it does not need any of the standard single-
crossing assumptions which are typical of these comparative statics exercises.
Intuitively, it states that although regional integration stabilizes autarky prices
across regions, it can destabilize producers’ expectations, rendering more com-
pelling the necessity of an ’exogenous price intervention’ than it was in the autar-
kic regime. Notice that the non-linear class of economies allows one to reconcile
the results of proposition 6 with Guesnerie’s [14] adduced general intuition (GI2)
that heterogeneity is detrimental to expectational coordination. In this sense, it
provides an open economy interpretation of the forces behind: because economic
integration equalizes pre-trade prices across regions, it creates a redistributional
conﬂict between heterogeneous producers, who respond in proportion of their
diﬀerences. Since the higher the degree of heterogeneity in the responses is, the
more diﬃcult it becomes for them to individually forecast, it is intuitive that
the likelihood of successful coordination (on the open economy PFE price) de-
creases. Or stated more formally, as expectational stability is characterized by
a condition on ﬁrst derivatives, the consequences of policy changes upon it are
characterized by a condition on second derivatives. Second derivatives precisely
measure the magnitude of the individual reactions to the policy change which,
because of its redistributive nature, embodies expectations of a diﬀerent sign.
Hence, the result of the proposition. Finally, notice that the same explanation
holds for propositions 7 and 8, because diﬀerences in consumers’ willingnesses
to pay allow diﬀerences in the magnitude of producers’ reactions across regions
in real cost terms, i.e. in costs per unit of regional purchasing power.
There remains to show that in the class of economies considered, regional
integration actually equalizes (stabilizes) autarky equilibrium prices across re-
gions:
Proposition 12 p ∈
h
min
m pm,max
m pm
i
Proof. See appendix 5.
For the sake of completeness, we let the reader remark that when diﬀerences
in the maximal willingnesses to pay are allowed across economies in the non-
linear class M, the PFE price of the regional integration is more diﬃcult to
22learn than when they are absent. The proof follows the steps of proposition 8
and is immediate once we notice that:
ϕ0 (p)=κ{m:p≤pm
0 }
X
m
αmϕ0
m (p)
With κ{m:p≤pm
0 } ≥ 1 as before, and with exactly the same interpretation.
5 Coordination and Welfare
An important rationale motivating open economy excercises are welfare con-
siderations. In this section we will study this more traditional rationale for
opening our partial equilibrium economies and relate it to the coordinational
considerations studied in the previous sections. However, the nature of the ex-
ercise is necessarily from an ex-ante viewpoint (before integration takes place)
and can be described as follows: Suppose that a given economy is considering
with which country to integrate among those in a given class. A possible evalua-
tion criterion is welfare, disregarding coordinational issues. Another evaluation
criterion is expectational coordination. If we compare the reccomendations of
both, do they coincide? The answer to this precise question wants to illustrate
Guesnerie’s [12] described trade-oﬀ, also present in this open economy exer-
cise: standard eﬃciency gains associated with economic integration have to be
weighted against the diminished plausibility of the PFE price in terms of its pre-
dictability after integration, as advanced by proposition 11. Nevertheless, the
important caveat mentioned at the end of this section compromises any general
conclusion beyond the simple exercise performed below.
Consider the linear class of economies where farmers face the same aggregate
demand function, Dn(p)=D(p),∀n, but diﬀer in their cost structures across
regions. The integrated economy will be more eﬃcient than the autarkic ones
if we measure eﬃciency by the net change in the Marshallian aggregate surplus
(net producers’ proﬁts plus net consumers’ surplus) and this change is positive46.
The increase in welfare from integration for a given n region is then deﬁned by47:
∆Wn ≡ W∗
n − Wn = ∆CSn − ∆Πn
=
Z pn
p∗
Dn(p)dp −
Z pn
p∗
Sn(p)dp
It can be seen that a conﬂict exists between the consumers and the producers
of each of the integrating economies. The economy with the relatively more
46Since there are no general equilibrium eﬀects (because there is no trade as only one product
is considered), two economies in the class considered here have an incentive to integrate when
appropriate redistributional schemes are implemented. For a more detailed discussion, see
Mas-Colell et al. [19], section 10.E.
47We slightly change notation relative to the previous sections: now p∗ (instead of p)d e n o t e s
the integration equilibrium price, while pn still denotes the autarkic equilibrium price of region
n.
23performant producers48 (max
n Cn) experiences an increase in proﬁts (∆Πn >
0) from selling abroad part of their production at a price p∗ higher than the
autarkic one pn. This increase in the price damages the consumers living in that
region, who see their consumer surplus eroded relative to the autarkic situation,
∆CSn < 0. The converse happens in the region with the least performant
producers (min
n Cn). But, the aggregate surplus increases after integration in
each of the integrating economies49:
∆Wn =
Z pn
p∗
[A − Bp]dp −
Z pn
p∗
[Cnp]dp
=
∙
Ap
2
½
2 −
B + Cn
A
p
¾¸pn
p∗
=
B + Cn
2
[pn − p∗]
2 > 0,∀n
Because of this fact, we can assume that national (internal lump-sum ex-post)
transfer schemes exist that are able to (more than) compensate the adversely
aﬀected party. This is always possible in this partial equilibrium framework,
a n de v e r y b o d yc a nb em a d es t r i c t l yb e t t e ro ﬀ after integration50.
From this ex-ante welfare evaluation criterion, a given economy in the linear
class would ideally choose an integration partner with which the increase in the
net aggregate surplus is maximized. Region H must decide with which of the
two region types (F or A) would it integrate, assuming that the producers in
region F are more performant than those in the H region, while those in region
Aa r el e s s :
+∞ >C F >C H >C A > 0
Call the resulting integrated equilibrium prices p∗
H+F and p∗
H+A. From the an-
alytic expression of the net welfare gains in region n, ∆Wn, we can see that
0 ∈ arg sup
CA:CA≤CH
∆W
H+A
H =
B + CH
2
£
pH − p∗
H+A(CA)
¤2
Because, given the autarky price in the home region pH, the largest possible
value of the integrated economy equilibrium price p∗
H+A is obtained when the
less performant among the abroad regions (A) is selected, i.e. as CA −→ 0.
Since the home region (H) is more eﬃcient, autarky prices are going to be lower:
p∗
H+A −pH > 0. As this diﬀerence is maximal whenever CA −→ 0, denote by ω
48Note that with the speciﬁed cost structures, ∂CfC(qf,f)=−
µ
qf √
2Cf
¶2
< 0. Therefore,
higher values of the cost parameter Cf correspond to lower production costs, and to a relatively
more performant production technique.
49Where CΣ =
P
n Cn denotes the parameter of the total cost function in the integrated
economy CΣ(q). Notice that, with an abuse of notation, we denote both a given integrating
region and the summation subindex by n.
50Individual lump-sum transfer schemes could have been implemented in the way proposed
by Dixit and Norman [6] (sec. 3.2.), as this partial equilibrium economy can be considered as
a particular case of the general equilibrium economy they consider.
24its maximum value:
ω =l i m
CA−→0
p∗
H+A(CA) − pH =
A
B + CH
2
−
A
B + CH
> 0
Now, we look, among the foreign economies (F) that are more eﬃcient than the
home region, whether there is one that allows the home region to attain this
same level of welfare ∆W
H+A
H (ω)=B+CH
2 [ω]
2 . Since the foreign economy (F)
is more eﬃcient, the integrated economy equilibrium price will be lower than
the autarky equilibrium price at home (H), pH − p∗
H+F > 0. Then our problem
c a nb es t a t e df o r m a l l ya s :
∃CF : pH − p∗
H+F(CF) > ω
To prove this statement, we are going to proceed as follows: ﬁrst, we are going
to show that there exists a foreign region with a cost function parameter CF
such that the home economy reaches the level of welfare ∆W
H+A
H (ω). Then, we
are going to show that there is a set of more performant foreign regions, the
integration of home with which yields strictly larger welfare gains. Finally, we
show that as the home region becomes more eﬃcient, it also becomes increas-
ingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd such an F-region, in the sense that the ’measure’ of the set
of F-regions the integration with which yields larger expected welfare gains for
the H-region, becomes close to zero.
First, CF = CH
¡
2+CH
B
¢
satisﬁes the equation51:
pH − p∗
H+F(CF)=ω =⇒ ∆W
H+F
H (ω)=∆W
H+A
H (ω)
Second, geometrically notice that CF + CH =t a n θF+H. Provided that
the home economy has an aggregate cost parameter strictly bounded from
above, CH < +∞, and that it is not ’too expectationally unstable’, CH
B <
M<+∞,t h e nCF + CH = CH
¡
3+CH
B
¢
will also be strictly bounded above:
arctanCH
¡
3+CH
B
¢
= θF+H < π
2 =a r c t a n ( + ∞). By continuity, there will
exist a δ>0:θF+H < θF+H +δ<π
2 which will correspond to a foreign region
with an aggregate cost parameter CF < +∞ : CF + CH =t a n
£
θF+H + δ
¤
=
CH
¡
3+CH
B
¢
+ ∆C and that will generate a strictly larger welfare gain for the
home economy:
∆W
H+F
H > ∆W
H+F
H (ω) ⇐⇒ ∆C>0
51For the class of linear economies considered with identical aggregate demand, the F-
region with a value of the aggregate cost parameter CF that satisﬁes the above equation,
must equivalently satisfy the condition:
B + CF
B + CH
=
B + CH
B + CA
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
CA=0
Whenever this condition is respected, the welfare gains for the home region from integrating
with a more eﬃcient (F) or with a less eﬃcient (A) economy are the same, for economies in
the linear class considered.
25Which is true by construction. Therefore, home integration with an F-region
characterized by an aggregate cost parameter CF displays strictly larger welfare
gains than with the best possible integration partner in the set of A-regions.
Finally, under the just stated conditions, there exists an inﬁnity of foreign
regions (F) that satisfy this condition, but the size of the set becomes smaller
the more eﬃcient the home region is, i.e. the larger the value of the parameter
CH. If we put a uniform probability measure on
£
0, π
2
¤
we can interpret the
expression
1 − µ
£
θF+H
¤
=
Z π
2
θF+H
2
π
dv =1−
arctanCH
¡
3+CH
B
¢
π
2
as the likelihood of ﬁnding one F-region the integration with which provides
higher welfare gains for the home region than integration with the best can-
didate in the set of A-regions. Then, from lim
CH→+∞
©
1 − µ
£
θF+H
¤ª
=0we
conclude that the more eﬃcient the home region is, the lower the probability
of ﬁnding an F-region the integration with which will yield the same welfare
gains for home than integration with the best candidate A-region (all relatively
less performant). Alternatively, the more performant the home region is, the
smaller the size of the set of those F-regions the integration with which provides
home with higher welfare gains than integration with the best candidate in the
set of A-regions.
Now, the important point to be noted about this ex-ante welfare evaluation
of the potential partner with which to integrate is that, the less performant the
integrating partner is (the smaller the value of the aggregate cost parameter
C), the easier the coordination upon the perfect foresight equilibrium of the
integrated economy. And conversely. For a strictly ﬁnite value of CH, we also
see that the likelihood of ﬁnding such an F-region integration partner decreases
with the ’degree of expectational instability’ of the home region, as measured
by CH
B . This can be seen immediately from the fact that:
∂B
©
1 − µ
£
θF+H(B)
¤ª
= −
2
π
∂BθF+H(B)=
2
π
¡CH
B
¢2
1+C2
H
¡
3+CH
B
¢2 > 0
Therefore, the higher the degree of expectational stability of the home economy
(the higher the value of B, the lower the value of CH
B ), the higher the likelihood
of ﬁnding an economy in the F-class the integration with which yields strictly
larger welfare gains than integration with an economy in the A-class. Recall
that regions in the A-class are those expectationally more stable than the home
economy because they face the same aggregate demand (and therefore, the same
value of the elasticity of demand B) but operate with higher costs: 1
CH <
1
CA,∀q. Stated otherwise, if the purpose of Home economic integration is to
maximize the welfare gains, relatively more performant regions will be preferred
(F-regions will be preferred to A-regions), and government restrictions will be
most likely called for to coordinate upon the equilibrium price of the resulting
26integrated economy. However, if the objective of Home economic integration is
expectational coordination, relatively less performant regions will be preferred
(A-regions will be preferred to F-regions). This is a surprising conclusion, the
robustness of which remains to be ascertained52.
A caveat is in order. When the PFE price is not the unique rationalizable
expectations equilibrium price, the aggregate surplus need not be the appro-
priate evaluation criterion in welfare terms. The reason is that it is based on
the diﬀerence in welfare terms between the two Nash equilibrium prices (au-
tarkic and integration) disregarding whether they can be educed or not. A
more appropriate criterion in welfare terms would necessitate of computing pro-
ducers’ welfare when the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria is not a
singleton. A solution to this serious problem (selection among a continuum of
rationalizable equilibria) is beyond the scope of the present work. Therefore, a
general conclusion along the lines of Guesnerie’s [12] assertion mentioned in the
beginning of the section is conditional to it.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this work we have departed from the modern macroeconomics literature,
which since the 70s, has devoted increasing eﬀort to the assumptions justifying
the implementation of a REE solution. Learning constitutes the current par-
adigm. Adopting the eductive learning viewpoint, we have related free-trade
expectational stability conditions to autarkic ones, and provided an open econ-
omy natural interpretation to the elasticities condition identiﬁed by Guesnerie
[11]. In the class of one-dimensional partial equilibrium models where the price
is determined by the price expectations of inﬁnitesimal but heterogeneous pro-
ducers, trade captures the standard increase in product market competition
complemented by its impact on producers’ expectations53. As new entrants
gain access to the Home market, the relative scarcity of the home produced
commodity decreases, intensifying competition and lowering the price and prof-
its of home producers, compelling their forecasts to increasingly rely on the
strategic component of what do others expect, so undermining expectational
coordination (adverse eﬀect of a high supply elasticity). On the contrary, as
new markets are available to the home producers, the relative scarcity of the
home produced commodity increases leading both to higher prices and proﬁts.
As home competition is relaxed, so is the weight of the strategic component on
producers’ forecasts, easening expectational coordination (favourable eﬀect of a
high demand elasticity). Overall, policy changes that alter the competitive con-
52What seems crucial for the argument to extend to non-linear schedules is the existence of
a ﬁnite maximal willingness to pay for the good.
53Recent contributions on ﬁrm heterogeneity in a general equilibrium setup have rather
f o c u s e do nt h eb e n e ﬁcial impact of trade on aggregate productivity through the improved
labor allocation that the existence of better opportunities abroad entails. These contributions
abstract from the standard increase in competition channel. See Bernard et al. [2] for a
ricardian model with endogenous mark-ups, or Melitz [20] for a monopolistically competitive
model where the number of varieties produced is endogenous.
27ditions have an impact on producers’ ability to decide on a course of action, as
measured by its impact on the accuracy of their forecasts. In standard classical
and new trade theory models this aspect is absent, because the implicit action of
the Walrasian auctioneer provides the invisible though necessary coordinational
device.
As well, we have provided some new insights on the classical issue of trade-
induced eﬃciency gains, and shown that the same spatial diﬀerences in con-
sumers’ valuations or in price-varying elasticities that are detrimental to ex-
pectational stability, create the necessary spatial heterogeneity for the standard
gains-to-trade argument to work (spatial price equalization or stabilization).
Then, as spatial price stabilization destabilizes producers’ price expectations,
an exogenous intervention at the international level is justiﬁed since it allows
the integrating regions to fully reap the (standard) beneﬁts of trade. To illus-
trate this point, we have compared the expectational coordination objective to
a traditional ’welfare gain’ objective. We have shown that the maximal wel-
fare gain for an autarkic expectationally stable region in the linear class obtains
when integrating with an unstable region, compromising the objective of ex-
pectational coordination after integration. This example provides some precise
content in an international economy setup to the trade-oﬀ noticed by Guesnerie
[12], i.e. that the standard eﬃciency gains associated with economic integration
must be weighted against the consequent increase in the plausibility of multiplic-
ity of (rationalizable expectations) equilibria. However we also pointed out that
this conclusion sidesteps the issue of evaluating equilibrium outcomes in welfare
terms when the expectational stability test fails54. As such, no general conclu-
sion can be taken before tackling the selection problem among rationalizable
equilibria.
Although a natural extension would be to study whether the conditions for
the eductive stability of the equilibrium in an open economy can be related to
the basic theorems of international trade, a ﬁrst diﬃculty stems in recognizing
that most of such trade theorems concern comparative statics questions in a
general equilibrium set up. Yet, most of the conclusions on the eductive stabil-
ity literature relate to partial equilibrium economies55. Nevertheless, we hope
to have provided insights that may prove fruitful in studying markets where
structural changes that increase the heterogeneity of the system can be tied to
increased volatility or to the emergence of multiple equilibria.
54In this sense, the application of continuous random selections over the set of rational-
izable expectations equilibria, along the lines of Allen et al. [1], seems a necessary step in
making progress through a meaningful gains-to-trade evaluation criterion meeting the learning
justiﬁcation requirements.
55General equilibrium applications of the eductive viewpoint are scarce. Some of them are
Guesnerie [13], Guesnerie and Hens [15] and Ghosal [10]. Calvo and Guesnerie [4] provide a
brief introduction.
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Appendix 0
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Under the condition An
Bn =
An0
Bn0 = A
B,∀n,n0 ∈ N the anchorage assumption
is given by p0 = AΣ
BΣ = A
B. For parts (i),(ii) compute the limit lim
τ→+∞pτ of
the price sequence in proposition 3 after replacing
³
− CΣ
Bn0
´
by
³
−CΣ
BΣ
´
,a n d
An0
Bn0 by AΣ
BΣ. To prove part (iii) notice that D(p)=
P
n Dn(p) implies that
D0(p)=
P
n D0
n(p) ≤ 0 by D0
n(p) ≤ 0,∀n. Also, S(p)=
P
n Sn(p) implies that
S0(p)=
P
n S0
n(p) > 0 by S0
n(p) > 0,∀n. The linearity of the regional demand
and supply schedules implies that: D0
n(p1)=D0
n(p2),S 0
n(p1)=S0
n(p2),∀n and
∀p1,p 2 ∈ [0,p 0), ∀p1,p 2 ∈ [p0,+∞),.From part (i) in proposition 2, |ϕ0(p)| =
30¯ ¯ ¯
S0(p)
D0(p)
¯ ¯ ¯ < 1,∀p. Expanding the sums and using the linearity, we can rewrite
it as |ϕ0(p)| =
¯ ¯ ¯
P
n
D0
n(p)
D0(p)
S0
n(p)
D0
n(p)
¯ ¯ ¯ = |
P
n αnϕ0
n(p)| < 1,∀p. Since ∀n,αn ≥ 0,
P
n αn =1 , the regional integration expectational stability condition is a convex
combination of the autarkic expectational stability conditions. Therefore:
min
n |ϕ0
n (p)| ≤ |ϕ0 (p)| =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X
n
αnϕ0
n (p)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤ max
n |ϕ0
n (p)|
implies that if the autarkically most unstable region is expectationally stable,
so must the regional integration be:
max
n |ϕ0
n (p)| < 1= ⇒ |ϕ0 (p)| < 1
That the converse is not true follows trivially from the convex combination set
of inequalities above.Q.E.D.
Appendix 1
Derivation and properties of the cobweb function
Derivation of the cobweb function ϕ(p;CΣ)=m a x {ϕ1(p;CΣ),ϕ 2(p;CΣ)}
for the agricultural economy n =1+2 , with:
ϕ1(p;CΣ)=
AΣ
BΣ
−
µ
CΣ
BΣ
¶
p
ϕ2(p;CΣ)=
A2
B2
−
µ
CΣ
B2
¶
p
1) ϕ(.) is a continuous function: ϕ(.) is a continuous function since it is
composed by two linear functions which always intersect in the price domain.
Denote by pi the price function at which both linear functions intersect, i.e.
ϕ1(pi;CΣ)=ϕ2(pi;CΣ). It will be equal to:
pi(CΣ)=
B2AΣ − A2BΣ
(B2 − BΣ)CΣ
=
A1CΣ
B1CΣ
With CΣ ≡ A2
h
B1
A1 − B2
A2
i
. The linear functions deﬁning the intersecting price
are well-deﬁned, mapping ϕ1(p;CΣ):
h
0, AΣ
CΣ
i
→
h
0, AΣ
BΣ
i
and ϕ2(p;CΣ):
h
0, A2
CΣ
i
→
h
0, A2
B2
i
. To see that they always intersect, observe that ϕ2(0;CΣ)−ϕ1(0;CΣ)=
A2
B2 − AΣ
BΣ = B1
BΣ
h
A2
B2 − A1
B1
i
> 0 and that ϕ2( A2
CΣ;CΣ) − ϕ1( A2
CΣ;CΣ)=0− AΣ
BΣ +
CΣ
BΣ
A2
CΣ < 0. Since both are linear, both are continuous.
312 )T h ec o b w e bf u n c t i o ni sam a x i m u m :First observe that:
ϕ(p;CΣ)=m a x
©
ϕ1(p;CΣ),ϕ 2(p;CΣ)
ª
=m a x
©
p(CΣ),p(CΣ)
ª
= p(CΣ)=
A1
B1
= pi(CΣ)
Meaning that there exists a value of the aggregate cost parameter for which the
price equilibrium coincides with the common intesecting price, and therefore
will be a point in the range of the cobweb function.
Now consider w.l.o.g. a CΣ = C0
Σ > CΣ, and denote by p0 the corresponding
PFE price equilibrium. By deﬁnition, ϕ(p0;C0
Σ)=p0. Since C0
Σ > CΣ then
ϕ1(p0;C0
Σ)=p0 whereas ϕ2(p0;C0
Σ) 6= p0. If the function is a maximum, it must
b et h ec a s et h a tϕ2(p0;C0
Σ) < p0 = ϕ1(p0;C0
Σ).
Proof: It will be the case if the price at which both linear functions intersect
is smaller than the equilibrium price, i.e. if pi(C0
Σ) < p0. Suppose that the
opposite is true. Then:
A1CΣ
B1C0
Σ
= pi(C0
Σ) > p0 =
AΣ
BΣ + C0
Σ
⇐⇒
A2
B1
A1
− B2 = CΣ >
B1
A1
C0
ΣAΣ
BΣ + C0
Σ
=
C0
Σ
³
B1 + A2
B1
A1
´
BΣ + C0
Σ
⇐⇒
A2
B1
A1
BΣ − (BΣ + C0
Σ)B2 = CΣBΣ − C0
ΣB2 >C 0
ΣB1 ⇐⇒ CΣ >C 0
Σ
A contradiction. Therefore, the cobweb function is a maximum. Q.E.D.
Using this fact and the intersecting price pi(CΣ), we can also write the
cobweb function as follows:
ϕ(p;CΣ)=m a x {ϕ1(p;CΣ),ϕ 2(p;CΣ)}
=
½
ϕ2(p;CΣ) if p ≤ pi(CΣ)
ϕ1(p;CΣ) if p ≥ pi(CΣ)
A fact that follows from the observing that ϕ2(0;CΣ)=A2
B2 >ϕ 1(0;CΣ)=AΣ
BΣ
and that |∂pϕ2(p;CΣ)| =
¯ ¯ ¯−CΣ
B2
¯ ¯ ¯ > |∂pϕ1(p;CΣ)| =
¯ ¯ ¯−CΣ
BΣ
¯ ¯ ¯,∀p ∈ [0,p ∞) with
p∞ ≡ (ϕ1)
−1 (0;CΣ).
3) The cobweb function is (weakly) decreasing: We can conclude that the
cobweb function is decreasing in its price domain ∂pϕ(p;CΣ) < 0 from the fact
that it is the maximum of two strictly decreasing linear functions ∂pϕn(p;CΣ) <
0,n=1 ,2. However ϕ(p;CΣ) is not C1 because it is a max function with a non-
diﬀerentiability point at the intersecting price pi(CΣ).
4) Domain and Range of the cobweb function: Finally observe that since
the cobweb function maps prices into prices with domain and range given by
32ϕ(p;CΣ):
h
0,max
n
(ϕ1)
−1 (0),(ϕ2)
−1 (0)
oi
→ [0,max{ϕ1(0;CΣ),ϕ 2(0;CΣ)}]
with max
n
(ϕ1)
−1 (0),(ϕ2)
−1 (0)
o
=( ϕ1)
−1 (0) = AΣ
CΣand max{ϕ1(0;CΣ),ϕ 2(0;CΣ)} =
ϕ2(0;CΣ)=A2
B2.
Using that ϕ(p;CΣ) is a decreasing function and the intersecting price pi(CΣ)
to know where the equilibrium price is, i.e.
ϕ1(pi;CΣ)=ϕ2(pi;CΣ) >p i(CΣ)= ⇒ pi(CΣ) <ϕ (p;CΣ)=ϕ1(p;CΣ)=p
ϕ1(pi;CΣ)=ϕ2(pi;CΣ) <p i(CΣ)= ⇒ pi(CΣ) >ϕ (p;CΣ)=ϕ2(p;CΣ)=p
ϕ1(pi;CΣ)=ϕ2(pi;CΣ)=pi(CΣ)= ⇒ pi(CΣ)=ϕ(p;CΣ)=ϕ1(p;CΣ)=ϕ2(p;CΣ)=p
This observation will be useful in the study of the second iterate of the cobweb
function, in appendix 2. This concludes the description of the properties of the
cobweb function.
Appendix 2
Derivation of ϕ2(.).
Derivation of the second iterate of the cobweb function ϕ2(p) :
ϕ2(p)=ϕ(ϕ(p)) = max{ϕ1 [ϕ(p)],ϕ 2 [ϕ(p)]}
=m a x {ϕ1 [max{ϕ1(p),ϕ 2(p)}],ϕ 2 [max{ϕ1(p),ϕ 2(p)}]}
=m a x {min{(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)},min{(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)}}
Where the ﬁrst equalities follow by deﬁnition, and the last one follows from the
downward slopingness of the functions ϕn(.) so that ϕn [max{ϕ1(p),ϕ 2(p)}]=
min{ϕn (ϕ2(p)),ϕ n (ϕ1(p))} for n =1 ,2. The diﬀerent linear functions com-
posing its deﬁnition are given by:
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=
AΣ
BΣ
+
A2
B2
µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶
+
µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶
p
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)=
A2
B2
+
AΣ
BΣ
µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶
+
µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶
p
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)=
AΣ
BΣ
+
AΣ
BΣ
µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶
+
µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶2
p
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=
A2
B2
+
A2
B2
µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶
+
µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶2
p
Before proceeding, we can study the functions that compose ϕ2(p), which are
ϕ1 [ϕ(p)], and ϕ2 [ϕ(p)]. These two functions are well deﬁned since they are
the composition of a linear function and a continuous maximum fuction, map-
ping (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(p):
h
0,(ϕ1)
−1 (0)
i
ϕ
→ [0,ϕ 2(0;CΣ)]
ϕ1 → [ϕ1 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)],ϕ 1(0)]
33and (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(p):
h
0,(ϕ1)
−1 (0)
i
ϕ
→ [0,ϕ 2(0;CΣ)]
ϕ2 → [ϕ2 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)],ϕ 2(0)],
since max
n
(ϕ1)
−1 (0),(ϕ2)
−1 (0)
o
=( ϕ1)
−1 (0), max{ϕ1(0;CΣ),ϕ 2(0;CΣ)} =
ϕ2(0;CΣ) and (ϕn)
0 (.) < 0,∀n. Therefore, the second iterate of the cobweb func-
tion maps ϕ2(p):
h
0,(ϕ1)
−1 (0)
i
max{ϕ1◦ϕ,ϕ2◦ϕ}
→ [max{ϕ1 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)],ϕ 2 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)]},ϕ 2(0)].
Where max{ϕ1 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)],ϕ 2 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)]} = ϕ1 [ϕ2(0;CΣ)].
Derivation of pi0 and properties characterizing the function ϕ2(.)
There is a (second) intesecting price, denoted pi0(CΣ), that characterizes the
second iterate of the cobweb function satisfying:
∃pi0 :( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=ϕ2(pi0)
And with the properties that:
1) It characterizes the second iterate of the cobweb function (toghether with
pi) as a piecewise linear function:
ϕ2(p)=
½
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(p) if ϕ(p) ≥ ϕ(pi0) ⇐⇒ p ≤ pi0
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(p) if ϕ(p) ≤ ϕ(pi0) ⇐⇒ p ≥ pi0
Using the property |∂pϕ2(p;CΣ)| > |∂pϕ1(p;CΣ)| and ϕ0(.) < 0. And as we
showed in appendix 1 for the cobweb function, this intersecting price pi0 also
satisﬁes by deﬁnition and by ϕ0(.) < 0 that if:
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=ϕ2(pi0) >ϕ (pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p) >ϕ (pi0) ⇐⇒ p<p i0
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=ϕ2(pi0) <ϕ (pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ2(p) <ϕ (pi0) ⇐⇒ p>p i0
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(pi0)=ϕ2(pi0)=ϕ(pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p)=ϕ2(p)=ϕ(pi0) ⇐⇒ p = pi0
2) Explicit expression for pi0:
To obtain an explicit expression for pi0(CΣ) we can solve the equation (ϕ1 ◦
ϕ)(pi0)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ)(pi0) yielding:
CΣϕ(pi0)=
A1
B1
CΣ ⇐⇒ ϕ(pi0)=pi
Where pi ≡ pi (CΣ)=A1
B1
CΣ
CΣ is the (ﬁrst) intersecting price we derived in
appendix 1. Given that if:
ϕ(pi) ≤ pi =⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ2(p),∀p ≤ pi
ϕ(pi) ≥ pi =⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p),∀p ≥ pi
and that by ϕ0(.) < 0 we have:
ϕ(pi0)=pi ≥ ϕ(pi) ⇐⇒ pi0 ≤ pi
ϕ(pi0)=pi ≤ ϕ(pi) ⇐⇒ pi0 ≥ pi
34we can conclude from both that:
if pi0 ≤ pi =⇒ ϕ(pi0)=ϕ2(pi0)=pi =⇒ pi0
2 = ϕ
−1
2 (pi)
if pi0 ≥ pi =⇒ ϕ(pi0)=ϕ1(pi0)=pi =⇒ pi0
1 = ϕ
−1
1 (pi)
With explicit formulas:
pi0
1(CΣ)=
AΣ
CΣ
−
µ
BΣ
CΣ
¶
pi(CΣ)
pi0
2(CΣ)=
A2
CΣ
−
µ
B2
CΣ
¶
pi(CΣ)
So that the explicit expression for pi0(CΣ) is:
pi0(CΣ)=m a x
©
pi0
1(CΣ),p i0
2(CΣ),0
ª
Proof:B e c a u s e ∀CΣ ≤ (≥)CΣ we have that pi(CΣ) ≥ (≤)pi0(CΣ) and
by the argument above, pi0(CΣ)=pi0
2(CΣ) ≥ pi0
1(CΣ)( pi0(CΣ)=pi0
1(CΣ) ≥
pi0
2(CΣ)). (i) To see that ∀CΣ ≤ (≥)CΣ we have that pi0
1(CΣ) ≤ (≥)pi0
2(CΣ)
we remark that the only value of CΣ at which both functions pi0
2(CΣ),p i0
1(CΣ)
intersect is CΣ = CΣ so that pi0
2(CΣ)=pi0
1(CΣ). At that point we also have:
∂CΣpi0
2(CΣ)=−
1
CΣ
A1
B1
∙
1 −
B2
CΣ
¸
And:
∂CΣpi0
1(CΣ)=−
1
CΣ
A1
B1
∙
1 −
BΣ
CΣ
¸
= ∂CΣpi0
2(CΣ)+
A1
¡
CΣ
¢2
So that at the unique point at which both functions intersect, we have ∂CΣpi0
1(CΣ) >
∂CΣpi0
2(CΣ) concluding that ∀CΣ ≤ (≥)CΣ we have that pi0
1(CΣ) ≤ (≥)pi0
2(CΣ).
(ii) Now, it is also true that the only value of CΣ at which each of the func-
tions pi0
2(CΣ),p i0
1(CΣ) intersects with pi(CΣ) is CΣ = CΣ. Therefore pi0
2(CΣ)=
pi0
1(CΣ)=pi(CΣ). Since at that point it is also true that ∂CΣpi(CΣ)=− 1
CΣ
A1
B1,
b y( i )i ti st r u et h a t∂CΣpi0
2(CΣ)=∂CΣpi(CΣ)+ A1B2
B1(CΣ)
2 and consequently
∂CΣpi0
1(CΣ) >∂ CΣpi0
2(CΣ) >∂ CΣpi(CΣ). We can then conclude that ∀CΣ ≤ (≥
)CΣ we have that pi(CΣ) ≥ (≤)pi0(CΣ) as we wanted to show. Q.E.D.
3) Non-monotonicity of pi0 :
Observe that:
∂CΣpi0
2(CΣ) > (≤)0 if CΣ < (≥)B2 ≡ C2
Σ
∂CΣpi0
1(CΣ) > 0 if CΣ <B 2 + B1 ≡ C1
Σ
Where the last row follows from a fact that will be used below again, but that we
prove here: Suppose by contradiction that CΣ ≥ C1
Σ. Equivalently, A2
B1
A1 −B2 ≥
35BΣ or B1
h
A2
A1 − 1
i
≥ 2B2. Since A1 ≥ A2, A2
A1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≥ B1
h
A2
A1 − 1
i
≥ 2B2
violating the restriction B2 > 0. Therefore 0 ≤ CΣ <C 1
Σ and the slope of pi0
1
at the point CΣ = CΣ can only be positive: The maximum of pi0
1 will always
be at a value of the aggregate cost larger than CΣ. The functional form of both
functions displays a maximum in the aggregate cost domain R++.
Parameter values C1
Σ,C2
Σ will be used below to characterize the learning
dynamics.
4) Value of pi0 in the analytic case studied by Guesnerie [11]:
If A1
B1 = A2
B2 then CΣ =0and ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p),∀p and the intersecting price
pi =0 . In consequence, pi0 = ϕ
−1
1 (0) = AΣ
CΣ > 0 and p = p1 ∈
£
pi,p i0¤
=
£
0,p i0
1
¤
.
5) Deﬁnes a non-empty interval to which the perfect foresight equilibrium
price p always belongs:
Proof:C o n s i d e rt h e( ﬁrst) intesecting price pi(CΣ). We are going to show
that the perfect foresight equilibrium price p must be contained in a non-empty
interval between the two intersecting prices pi and pi0. First suppose that:
ϕ2(pi0) >ϕ (pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p) >ϕ (pi0) ⇐⇒ p<p i0
Now it can happen that p<p i so that p/ ∈
h
pi,p i0i
. But if p<p i from the
deﬁnition of pi we have that p = ϕ2(p). A contradiction since p<p i0. Therefore,
p>p i and p ∈
h
pi,p i0i
. Second suppose that:
ϕ2(pi0) <ϕ (pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ2(p) <ϕ (pi0) ⇐⇒ p>p i0
Which leads to p ∈
h
pi0
,p i
i
using the same reasoning. Finally, if:
ϕ2(pi0)=ϕ(pi0)= ⇒ ϕ(p)=ϕ1(p)=ϕ2(p)=ϕ(pi0) ⇐⇒ p = pi0
Then it must be the case by the same argument, that p ∈
h
pi0
,p i
i
= {p}.
Q.E.D.
Using some of these properties we can rewrite ϕ2(p) alternatively as follows:
ϕ2(p)=
½
min{(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)} if p ≤ pi0
min{(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)} if p ≥ pi0
=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
if pi0 ≥ pi
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if pi <p<p i0
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi0
if pi0 ≤ pi
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi0
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if pi0 <p<p i
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi
36Proof: To prove the second equality above, suppose that pi0 ≥ pi. Then for
every price smaller than pi,p≤ pi, the deﬁnition of the intersecting price pi
implies that ϕ2(p) ≥ ϕ1(p), and since (ϕ1)0(.) < 0 we have that (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) ≤
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p). Now since ϕ2(p)=m i n {(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)} if p ≤ pi0
from the ﬁrst equality, it follows that ϕ2(p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) for all prices p ≤ pi
which is the very ﬁrst row behind the second equality in the case pi0 ≥ pi. For the
second row, we have prices between both intersecting prices pi <p<p i0. By the
same reasoning, p ≥ pi =⇒ ϕ2(p) ≤ ϕ1(p) and using (ϕ1)0(.) < 0 we have that
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) ≥ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p). Now since ϕ2(p)=m i n{(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)}
if p ≤ pi0 from the ﬁrst equality, it follows that ϕ2(p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p) for
all prices pi <p<p i0. Finally, for the third row, prices satisfy p ≥ pi0 so
that ϕ2(p)=m i n {(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)}, but since pi0 ≥ pi =⇒ p ≥ pi
and therefore ϕ2(p) ≤ ϕ1(p). By (ϕ2)0(.) < 0 we have that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p) ≥
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)= ⇒ ϕ2(p)=m i n{(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p),(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p)} =( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), which
is what we wanted to show. To prove the case pi0 ≤ pi t h es a m ea r g u m e n ta p -
plies. Q.E.D.
Now, by deﬁning pi
inf =m a x
©
min
©
pi0,p iª
,p 1
ª
and pi
sup =m i n
©
max
©
pi0,p iª
,p ∞
ª
,
we can re-express in a more compact form ϕ2(p) as:
ϕ2(p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi
inf
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)1{pi
inf=pi} +( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)1{pi
inf=pi0} if p ∈
¡
pi
inf,p i
sup
¢
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi
sup
Where the symbol 1{pi
inf=pi} denotes the standard indicator function, taking
value 1 if pi
inf = pi and 0 otherwise.
Observations:
1) Since it can both happen that pi0 ≤ pi and pi0 ≥ pi so that pi0 = pi, the
deﬁnition of ϕ2(p) is correct and specializes to:
ϕ2(p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p),∀p
Proof: To see it, observe that if pi0 = pi from the deﬁnitions of pi
inf and
pi
sup, we have that pi
inf = pi
sup = pi = pi0. Then:
ϕ2(p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi
inf = pi
sup
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p)1{pi
inf=pi} +( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)1{pi
inf=pi0} if p = {∅}
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi
inf = pi
sup
=
½
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) if p ≤ pi
inf = pi
sup
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) if p ≥ pi
inf = pi
sup
Also since p ∈
£
pi
inf,p i
sup
¤
=
©
pi
inf = pi
sup
ª
, from the proof above we must have
that p = pi
inf = pi
sup = pi0 = pi. Recalling from appendix 1 that p = pi
whenever CΣ = CΣ and using the above explicit formulas for (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p) and
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), observe that they have the same slope for all possible prices p in
37their respective domains. Since they are both linear with the same slope, they
will coincide provided that their constant terms coincide:
AΣ
BΣ
+
A2
B2
µ
−
CΣ
BΣ
¶
=
A2
B2
+
AΣ
BΣ
µ
−
CΣ
B2
¶
⇐⇒
⇐⇒ CΣ = A2
∙
B1
A1
−
B2
A2
¸
≡ CΣ
Stating that the constant terms in the deﬁnition of the functions (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p)
and (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p) coincide whenever the aggregate cost parameter CΣ takes
the value CΣ compatible with p = pi. Therefore, ϕ2(p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p),∀p as we wanted to show. Q.E.D.
2) The reader must notice that the price domain of the second iterate of
the cobweb function can exclude one of the limit prices (pi
inf,p i
sup) deﬁning the
interval inside which the price equilibrium is determinate. To this purpose, sup-
pose ﬁrst that pi
inf = pi and ϕ2(pi) < 0. Then since ϕ2(.) is (weakly) increasing,
∃p0
1 : ∀ε>0,ϕ 2(p0
1 + ε) > 0 >ϕ 2(pi). T h e n ,w ec a ne n l a r g et h ed e ﬁnition of
pi
inf to pi
inf =m a x
©
min
©
pi0,p iª
,p 0
1
ª
. Proceeding identically for pi
sup we can
redeﬁne it as pi
sup =m i n
©
max
©
pi0,p iª
,p ∞
ª
where p∞ is the upper limit of the
cobweb function price domain, i.e. p∞ ≡ ϕ
−1
1 (0) = AΣ
CΣ. If max
©
pi0,p iª
= pi0
but pi0 >p 0, then we shall let pi
sup = p∞ a c c o r d i n gt oo u re n l a r g e dd e ﬁni-
tion. We will refer in the text to the enlarged deﬁnitions of pi
sup and pi
inf when
appropriate.
Appendix 3
Properties of ϕ2(.) as given by Guesnerie [11]:
1) ϕ2(.) is (weakly) increasing: since ∂ϕ2(p)=ϕ0 [ϕ(p)]ϕ0(p) and ϕ0(.) < 0,
we must have ∂ϕ2(p) > 0 (a.e.).
2) ϕ2(p)=p : trivial from ϕ(p)=p since ϕ2(p)=ϕ[ϕ(p)] = ϕ[p]=p.
3) The success of eductive learning can be assessed entirely from ϕ2(.) as
long as there exists some CK (initial) information on prices (that starts the
eductive game of guessing, i.e. p ≤ p0)a n dt h a t lim
τ→∞
¡
ϕ2¢τ (p0)=p.
Appendix 4
We completely characterize the learning dynamics of proposition 7. The
results are summarized in Table A4.1, and the deﬁnitions of the symbols imme-
diately follow:
38Table A4.1: Summary of Results of Proposition 7
CΣ
> [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] ∅
= C1
Σ [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0] [0,p 0]
∅
∅
∅
≥ {p} {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P
{p}|P
[0,p 0]
[0,p 0]
∅
= C0
Σ {p} {p}|P {p}|P {p}|P
{p}|P
[0,p 0]
[pc1,pc2]
[pc1,pc2] ∅
> {p} {p} {p}
{p}
{p}
[pc1,pc2]
[pc1,pc2] [pc1,pc2] ∅
= C2
Σ {p} {p}
{p}
{p}
[pc1,pc2]|
[pc1,pc2]| [pc1,pc2]| [pc1,pc2]| ∅
> {p}
{p}
{p}
{p}
{p} {p} {p} {p} ∅
0
∅
∅
∅
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
⎛
⎝
CΣ > CΣ
CΣ = CΣ
CΣ < CΣ
⎞
⎠ 0 < = C2
Σ < = C0
Σ ≤ C1
Σ = CΣ
The contents, following the results of proposition 2, indicate the set of
rationalizable-expectations equilibria, where the exogenous price restriction p0
is embedded in the model (it is the maximum willingness to pay of the integrated
economy demand):
-”[0,p 0]”means that the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria usually
contains the whole price domain [0,p 0]. As farmers learn nothing, p is not an
SREE;
-”[pc1,pc2]”means that the set of rationalizable prices is the whole segment
[pc1,pc2] ⊃ p, where pc2 = ϕ(pc1),ϕ 2(pct)=pct,t =1 ,2 deﬁne cycles of or-
der two of the cobweb function. For some parameterizations, the embedded
price restriction p0 can belong to the set [pc1,pc2]. Then, an exogenous price
invertevention is called for restricting p0 to be out of it: p0 / ∈ [pc1,pc2], denoting
such a requirement by ”[ pc1,pc2]|”, meaning ’[pc1,pc2] is the set of rationalizable
prices conditional to that price restriction’.
-”{p}” means that the only rationalizable-expectations price equilibrium is
the PFE p, and p is an SREE.
-” {p}|P ” means that the only rationalizable-expectations price equilibrium
39is the PFE p conditional to an exogenous price intervention restricting the nat-
ural one p0 to be in the basin of attraction56 of p, P(p)=( pc1,pc2)\{p}, and
p is an ’SREE conditional to that price restriction’.
As the characterization of ϕ2(.) depends on pi0,p i the learning dynamics will
ultimately depend on whether CΣ T CΣ, since from the deﬁnitions of pi0,p i
and their properties we know that they depend on the value of the aggregate
cost parameter CΣ. In principle, CΣ ∈ R++. We are going to divide the CΣ-
parameter space in four regions according to the following deﬁnitions of C0
Σ,C1
Σ
and C2
Σ satisfying:
+∞ >C 1
Σ ≥ C0
Σ >C 2
Σ > 0
With C1
Σ ≡ BΣ characterizing the limit value of the aggregate cost parameter
a b o v ew h i c ht h eP F Ep r i c ep becomes eductively unstable; C0
Σ ≡ B2
h
1+A1
A2
i
satisﬁes lim
A2
B2 →
A1
B1
C1
Σ = C0
Σ so that the whole region
£
C0
Σ,C1
Σ
¤
collapses into that
value
©
C0
Σ
ª
. Finally C2
Σ ≡ B2 characterizes the limit value of the aggregate
cost parameter below which the PFE price p becomes eductively stable, i.e. if
C2
Σ >C Σ > 0= ⇒ p is globally an SREE. Since the diﬀerence in the maximal
willingnesses to pay is measured by the parameter CΣ, its range of variation
will also be constrained to the regions for CΣ(57). We allow the possibility that
0=CΣ because it corresponds to the case studied in proposition 6.
Proof of the results in Table A4.1.
We are going to distinguish three broad cases, (those in brackets in the
south-west corner of Table A4.1):
(*) Case CΣ > CΣ (We prove the results in the upper triangular matrix
excluding the diagonal elements in the ﬁrst bissectrix of the plane (CΣ,C Σ))
a) If CΣ > CΣ =⇒ pi <p i0 ≡ ϕ
−1
1 (pi) by property 3 of pi0. Then, by the
deﬁnitions of pi
inf,p i
sup we have:
pi
inf =m a x
©
pi,p 0
1
ª
: p0
1 ≡ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
−1 (0) = p∞
∙
1 −
BΣ
CΣ
¸
pi
sup =m i n
©
pi0
1,p ∞
ª
: pi0
1 = p∞ −
BΣ
CΣ
pi
So that, since BΣ
CΣ > 0 and pi > 0, we have pi0
1 <p ∞ implying that pi
sup = pi0
1. On
the other hand, the deﬁnition of p0
1 implies that p0
1 > 0 ⇐⇒ 1 > BΣ
CΣ since p∞ > 0
which is necessary for p0
1 to be greater than pi > 0 although not suﬃcient. The
suﬃcient condition is that CΣ > CΣ + BΣ =⇒ pi
inf = p0
1 and that the second
iterate of the cobweb function is:
56The basin of attraction P(p) of a given equilibrium price p is composed by the union of
all the p0 6= p s.t. lim
τ−→ +∞
ϕτ(p0)=p.
57With the exception introduced by property 3 of the (second) intersecting price pi0 accord-
ing to which 0 ≤ CΣ <C 1
Σ. Details are in appendix 2.
40ϕ2(p)=
½
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ≤ pi0
1
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ≥ pi0
1
And by p0
1 > 0 ⇐⇒ 1 > BΣ
CΣ we have that
¡
ϕ2¢0 (p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
BΣ
´2
> 1
a n di nc o n s e q u e n c ep is not strongly rational in [p0
1,p ∞], corresponding to the
upper north-west corner of Table A4.1 (noticing that BΣ ≡ C1
Σ so that CΣ >
CΣ + C1
Σ >C 1
Σ) but also applies to the whole ﬁrst row (because CΣ ≥ 0,.we
have that CΣ > CΣ +C1
Σ =⇒ CΣ >C 1
Σ). The set of rationalizable expectations
equilibria is [p0
1,p ∞] ⊂ [0,p 0], that we note [0,p 0] in the table for simplicity.
Q.E.D.
b) Now, considering the polar case, CΣ <C Σ ≤ CΣ + C1
Σ =⇒ pi
inf = pi and
the deﬁnition of the second iterate of the cobweb function becomes:
ϕ2(p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p), if p ≤ pi
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ∈
¡
pi,p i0
1
¢
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ≥ pi0
1
Suppose then that CΣ = C1
Σ, implying no restriction on CΣ by CΣ ≤ CΣ +C1
Σ.
Observe that CΣ = C1
Σ ⇐⇒ 1=BΣ
CΣ and therefore
¡
ϕ2¢0 (p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
BΣ
´2
=1 ,∀p ∈
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p. Since (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(p) is a linear function of p in
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
, the whole segment is the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria.
This segment is nonempty provided that pi0
1 >p i ⇐⇒ A2
B2 < A1
B1
h
2+B1
B2
i
⇐⇒
CΣ <C 1
Σ which is always the case as showed above. Concerning the eductive
stability of the segment of rationalizable expectations equilibria, observe that it
depends on whether (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
−1 (0) ≡ p1 S 0 and on (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=CΣ
BΣ
CΣ
B2 ≡
CΣ
C2
Σ
CΣ
C1
Σ
. We have that:
p1 =
C2
Σ
CΣ
(p0 − p∞) >
(≤)
0 ⇐⇒ p0 >
(≤)
p∞ ⇐⇒ CΣ >
(≤)
C0
Σ
Since CΣ = C1
Σ >C 0
Σ >C 2
Σ we must have (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
−1 (0) ≡ p1 > 0 and
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)= CΣ
C2
Σ
CΣ
C1
Σ
¯ ¯ ¯
CΣ=C1
Σ
> 1, for every price p ∈
£
p1,p i¤
. But as well,
by (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p) > 1, ∀p ∈
£
pi0
1,p ∞
¤
. In consequence p is not
strongly rational in [p1,p ∞], the set of rationalizable expectations equilibria is
a connected segment
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p that we note ”[0,p 0]” for simplicity. It also
applies to the whole second row because we have not imposed any restriction
on CΣ except that CΣ <C Σ,.which is always satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
Now suppose that CΣ <C 1
Σ. We will distinguish two cases:
b.1.) C0
Σ ≤ CΣ <C 1
Σ =⇒
¡
ϕ2¢0 (p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
C1
Σ
´2
< 1,∀p ∈
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p, by the second inequality. This shows that p will be strongly
41rational on its basin of attraction, which will be non-empty since it will contain
at least ∀p ∈
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p.
Lemma b.1.): (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(pi) >p i.
Proof:T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
AΣ
BΣ
∙
1 −
CΣ
C1
Σ
¸
+
CΣ
C1
Σ
C2
Σ
C1
Σ
∙
A2
B2
−
A1
B1
¸
>
C2
Σ
CΣ
∙
A2
B2
−
A1
B1
¸
⇐⇒
AΣ
BΣ
>
A1
B1
CΣ
CΣ
But since CΣ > CΣ we have that A1
B1 > A1
B1
CΣ
CΣ whereas AΣ
BΣ > A1
B1 so that the
above inequality is always true and (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(pi) >p i which is what we wanted
to show. Q.E.D.
By deﬁnition of pi and by the result just proved, we have (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(pi)=
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pi) >p i. By the ﬁrst weak inequality of case b.1.), the deﬁnition of
p1 implies that p1 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p1)=0 . By Weierstrass’ theorem, ∃pc1 ∈ £
p1,p i¤
:( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pc1)=pc1. And since ϕ2(.) is C1 in the domain
£
p1,p i¤
, by
the mean value theorem, we must have (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (pc1)=
(ϕ1◦ϕ2)(p
i)−(ϕ1◦ϕ2)(p1)
pi−p1 >
1.
Replicating the same reasoning on the price domain
£
pi0
1,p ∞
¤
of ϕ2(.), we
have that (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)(pi0
1)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pi0
1) <p i0
1 where the inequality follows from
t h ef a c tt h a tb yp r o p e r t y5o fpi0 £
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p =⇒ pi0
1 ≤ p a n db yp r o p e r t y2
of ϕ2(.) we have p = ϕ2(p), so that since (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p) < 1 and
¡
ϕ2¢0 (.) is
of constant slope in
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
, the inequality must be true. We also have that
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p∞) >p ∞, a fact that can be observed by direct computation since
equivalent to
A2
C2
Σ
−
AΣ
C1
Σ
CΣ
C2
Σ
+
CΣ
C1
Σ
CΣ
C2
Σ
AΣ
CΣ
>
AΣ
CΣ
⇐⇒ CΣ >C 0
Σ
Therefore by Weierstrass’ theorem, ∃pc2 ∈
£
pi0
1,p ∞
¤
:( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pc2)=pc2.
And since ϕ2(.) is C1 in the domain
£
pi0
1,p ∞
¤
, by the mean value theorem, we
must have (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (pc2)=
(ϕ2◦ϕ1)(pi0
1 )−(ϕ2◦ϕ1)(p∞)
pi0
1 −p∞ > 1. Finally, notice that
ϕ1(pc2)=pc1 and that ϕ2(pc1)=pc2 so that {pc1,pc2} form a cycle of period
two.
To summarize the results of case b.1.): {pc1,pc2} constitute respectively the
lower and upper bounds of the connected segment of the rationalizable expecta-
tions equilibria (pc1,pc2) ⊃ p deﬁning the basin of attraction of p,P(p). When
restricted to its basin of attraction, p is an ”SREE subject to that restriction”,
i.e. ∀p0 ∈ P(p), that we note ” {p}|P ” since it can happen, as in the text, that
p0 / ∈ P(p). This corresponds to the third and fourth rows of the upper triangular
matrix in Table A4.1, excluding the ﬁrst bissectrix elements and the ﬁrst colum
ones. The ﬁrst column ones correspond to the case b.2.) because when CΣ =0 ,
C0
Σ = C1
Σ and case b.1.) collapses to case b.2.). Q.E.D.
42b.2.) CΣ <C 0
Σ ≤ C1
Σ. By the ﬁrst inequality and the deﬁnitions of p1,p ∞
we have that p1 < 0= ⇒ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(0) > 0 and that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p∞) <p ∞ by
t h ec o n v e r s ea r g u m e n tu s e di nb . 1 . ) .I ti ss t i l lt h ec a s et h a t(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p) < 1
for all p ∈
£
pi,p i0
1
¤
⊃ p. Now, even if (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p) ≷ 1 in their
respective price domains
£
0,p i¤
and
£
pi0
1,p ∞
¤
, p is the unique rationalizable
expectations equilibrium and it is strongly rational in [0,p ∞] (globally). This
corresponds to the results in the ﬁrst column of table A4.1 (CΣ =0 ) and to the
ﬁfth, sixth and seventh rows of the upper triangular matrix with respect to the
ﬁrst bissectrix, excluding the elements of the diagonal. Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of the results corresponding to case CΣ > CΣ.
Q.E.D.
(**) Case CΣ < CΣ (We prove the results in the lower triangular matrix
excluding the diagonal elements in the ﬁrst bissectrix of the plane (CΣ,C Σ)
deﬁned by Table A4.1)
a) If CΣ < CΣ =⇒ pi >p i0 ≡ ϕ
−1
2 (pi) by property 3 of pi0. Then, by the
deﬁnitions of pi
inf,p i
sup we have:
pi
inf =m a x
©
pi0
2,p 0
2,0
ª
: pi0
2 =
A2
CΣ
−
B2
CΣ
pi
pi
sup =m i n
©
pi,p ∞
ª
: pi = p∞ −
A1
CΣ
∙
1+
B2
B1
¸
<p ∞ =⇒ pi
sup = pi
Where pi0
2 = A2
CΣ − B2
CΣpi = p0
2 + A1
B1
³
B2
CΣ
´2
>p 0
2 and p0
2 ≡ (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)
−1 (0) =
A2
CΣ
h
1 − B2
CΣ
i
implying that pi
inf =m a x
©
pi0
2,0
ª
. From the deﬁnition of pi0
2 we
have pi0
2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ CΣ ≤ B2
h
1 − A1
B1
B2
A2
i
<B 2 by A1
B1 ≤ A2
B2, and by the deﬁnition
of pi
inf we have that pi
inf =m a x
©
pi0
2,0
ª
=0which on its turn implies that
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(0)> 0, by CΣ <B 2 =⇒ p0
2 < 0, and the second iterate of the cobweb
function becomes:
ϕ2(p)=
½
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p), if p<p i
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ≥ pi
Now, since CΣ <B 2 ≡ C2
Σ, we have that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
C2
Σ
´2
< 1, ∀p<p i
and by property 5 of pi0 we know that p ∈
£
pi0,p i¤
whenever CΣ < CΣ, letting
pi0 =0 . In consequence (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p) < 1 so that p is eductively stable in
[0,p i). That it is unique follows from the linearity (and therefore continuity) of
ϕ2(.) in the price domain [0,p i), toghether with the facts (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(0)> 0 and
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pi)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(pi) <p i that allow us to apply Weierstrass’ theorem
to ϕ2(.). To prove that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(pi) <p i we can use the explicit expression for
43pi = A2
CΣ − A1
B1
B2
CΣ and operating we ﬁnd:
A2
B2
∙
1 −
CΣ
B2
¸
+
µ
CΣ
B2
¶2
pi <p i ⇐⇒
A2
B2
−
A1
B1
CΣ
B2
<
A2
CΣ
−
A1
B1
B2
CΣ
⇐⇒
CΣ <B 2
A2
B2
B1
A1
∙
1 −
A1
B1
B2
A2
¸
Which, noticing that B2
h
1 − A1
B1
B2
A2
i
≤ B2
A2
B2
B1
A1
h
1 − A1
B1
B2
A2
i
because A2
B2
B1
A1 ≥ 1,
and that we are considering values of the aggregate cost such that CΣ ≤
B2
h
1 − A1
B1
B2
A2
i
, it is always the case. Finally, ∀p ≥ pi we have that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
C2
Σ
CΣ
C1
Σ
´
< 1, by C1
Σ >C 2
Σ >C Σ. Therefore, there exists a unique rationalizable
expectations equilibrium price p which is an SREE in [0,p ∞] (globally).
If however B2
h
1 − A1
B1
B2
A2
i
<C Σ <B 2 then pi0
2 > 0= ⇒ pi
inf =m a x
©
pi0
2,0
ª
=
pi0
2 and the second iterate of the cobweb function becomes:
ϕ2(p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p), if p ≤ pi0
2
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p), if p ∈
¡
pi0
2,p i¢
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p), if p ≥ pi
Since what was important for the existence and eductive stability of the equi-
librium was that CΣ <B 2 and by (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p) < 1,t h es a m e
conclusions follow for this enlarged deﬁnition of ϕ2(.). This case corresponds to
the bottom row of the lower triangular matrix in table A4.1, excluding the ﬁrst
bissectrix diagonal terms.Q.E.D.
b) Suppose now that CΣ >C Σ = B2. Then from the above deﬁnition of p0
2,
p0
2 =0and as well, (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=1 , for all p ∈
¡
pi0
2,p i¢
implying that all the
prices in this open interval will be rationalizable expectations prices. Whether
they are eductively stable or not will depend on the slope of (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (p)=
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p) which is smaller than one because C1
Σ >C 2
Σ = CΣ. Therefore, the
set of rationalizable expectations prices is the segment
£
pi0
2,p i¤
⊃ p,t h a tw en o t e
”[ pc1,pc2]|” for simplicity, and because p0 must be taken outside it. Observe
that ∀p ∈
£
pi0
2,p i¤
\{p} is an eductive cycle of period two. Since the reasoning
is independent of the value of CΣ as long as CΣ >C Σ, t h es a m ei st r u ef o r
the whole before last bottom row of the lower triangular matrix excepting the
elements in the ﬁrt bissectrix. Q.E.D.
c) The case CΣ >C 0
Σ ≥ CΣ corresponds to the second and third rows of the
lower triangular matrix of Table A4.1. Recalling that from the deﬁnition of p1
from case (*) we have,
p1 =
C2
Σ
CΣ
(p0 − p∞) >
(≤)
0 ⇐⇒ p0 >
(≤)
p∞ ⇐⇒ CΣ >
(≤)
C0
Σ
44and that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=
³
CΣ
C2
Σ
´2
> 1, for all p ∈
¡
pi0
2,p i¢
⊃ p. Therefore p
will not be eductively stable in
¡
pi0
2,p i¢
. Now since ϕ2(p)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=p
by property 2 of the second iterate of the cobweb function, and by property 5
of pi0, p ∈
¡
pi0
2,p i¢
the linearity of ϕ2(.) in prices implies that (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pi0
2)=
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(pi0
2) < (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=p which on its turn implies that (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pi0
2) <
pi0
2. Now the deﬁnition of p1 states that for the case under consideration, p1 ≤
0= ⇒ (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(0) ≥ 0. By property 1 of ϕ2(.), we have that pi0
2 > 0= ⇒
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pi0
2) > (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(0)≥ 0. Since ϕ2(.) is linear, it is continuous and C1
in the domain
£
0,p i0
2
¤
, and we can apply the mean value theorem for p ∈
¡
0,p i0
2
¢
,
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (p)=
(ϕ1◦ϕ2)(pi0
2 )−(ϕ1◦ϕ2)(0)
pi0
2 <
(ϕ1◦ϕ2)(pi0
2 )
pi0
2 < 1 by the inequality
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pi0
2) <p i0
2. By Weierstrass’ theorem, we have that ∃pc1 ∈
£
0,p i0
2
¤
:
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(pc1)=pc1, and by the mean value theorem, (ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)
0 (pc1) < 1. By
observing that (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pi)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(pi) > (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=p and therefore
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pi) >p i by the parallel reasoning, but that now (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p∞) ≤ p∞,
and using exactly the same argument, we can conclude that ∃pc2 ∈
£
pi,p ∞
¤
:
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(pc2)=pc2, and by the mean value theorem, (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)
0 (pc2) < 1. That
(ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p∞) ≤ p∞ was shown to be the case whenever C0
Σ ≥ CΣ in case (*)
part b.1.). Therefore we can conclude that the PFE price is not an SREE.
(pc1,pc2) is the interval of rationalizable prices provided that p0 / ∈ (pc1,pc2),
that we note ”[pc1,pc2]” for simplicity. The interval is bounded by the two-
period cycle of the cobweb function: ϕ1(pc2)=pc1 and ϕ2(pc1)=pc2. When-
ever CΣ → C0
Σ ≡ B2
h
1+A1
A2
i
, we have that pc1 → 0 and pc2 → p∞. This
completes the study of the results in the second and third rows of the lower
diagonal matrix, excluding the elements in the ﬁrst bissectrix.Q.E.D.
d) The case C1
Σ > CΣ >C Σ >C 0
Σ corresponds to the ﬁrst row of the lower
triangular matrix, below the ﬁrst bissectrix of Table A4.1. Relative to case c)
above, the only thing that changes is that since CΣ >C 0
Σ =⇒ p1 > 0 ⇐⇒
(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(0) < 0 but as well, (ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p∞) >p ∞ and in consequence, there
will be no intersection with the ﬁrst bissectrix other than p. Therefore, p is not
an SREE in [p1,p ∞] ⊂ [0.p0], and the set of rationalizable prices is noted to be
”[0.p0]”for simplicity. Q.E.D.
This completes the study of the case (**) CΣ >C Σ. Q.E.D.
Finally the results included in the diagonal terms of the ﬁrst bissectrix in
Table A4.1, corresponding to CΣ = CΣ, are easily proven recognizing that in
such a case pi = pi0 = p and that the second iterate of the cobweb function is a
linear function on its price domain equal to
ϕ2(p)=( ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2)(p)=( ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1)(p),∀p
A fact proved in the derivation of the second iterate of the cobweb function, ob-
servation 1. Everything will here depend on whether CΣ Q C0
Σ observing that
45the perfect foresight equilibrium price p will always be the unique rationalizable-
expectations equilibrium (SREE in [0,p ∞] whenever CΣ <C 0
Σ, and not an SREE
in [p1,p ∞] whenever CΣ >C 0
Σ). When CΣ = C0
Σ, a continuum of rationalizable-
expectations equilibria exists, composed by the segment [0,p ∞], and every price
in the segment will be a period-two cycle of the cobweb function with the ex-
ception of p. Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of the results in Table A4.1.
Appendix 5
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
Since ∃n,n0 ∈ N :An
Bn 6=
An0
Bn0 , assume that there exists a region the consumers
of which will not be able to aﬀord the consumption of the crop at the prevailing
PFE price p, we have that:
X
n:p≤pn
0
D0
n(p) ≥
X
n
D0
n (p)= ⇒
P
n D0
n(p)
P
n:p≤pn
0 D0
n(p)
"
X
n
αnϕ0
n (pn)
#
≤
P
n S0
n (p)
P
n D0
n (p)
=
X
n
αnϕ0
n (pn)
Taking absolute values on both sides:
|ϕ0 (p)| ≥
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X
n
αnϕ0
n (pn)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
So that when diﬀerences in the maximal willingness to pay for the crop exist
(LHS), the PFE price is ’more unstable’ than when they do not exist (RHS-
proposition 6). But we can measure by how much, since:
|ϕ0 (p)| < 1 ⇐⇒
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X
n
αnϕ0
n (pn)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
<
P
n:p≤pn
0 D0
n(p)
P
n D0
n(p)
≡
1
κ{n:p≤pn
0}
With κ{n:p≤pn
0} ≥ 1, taking value 1 when the integration equilibrium price p
is low enough so that the consumers of all the integrating regions can aﬀord to
pay it (the situation in proposition 6): i.e.
P
n:p≤pn
0 D0
n(p)=
P
n D0
n(p). Then
the conditions of proposition 6 are strengthened to:
κ{n:p≤pn
0}min
n |ϕ0
n (pn)| ≤ |ϕ0 (p)| ≤ κ{n:p≤pn
0}max
n |ϕ0
n (pn)|
Meaning that even if all autarkic price equilibria are expectationally stable, so
that max
n |ϕ0
n (pn)| < 1, the PFE price p can fail to be so whenever:
κ{n:p≤pn
0} >
1
max
n |ϕ0
n (pn)|
=⇒ |ϕ0 (p)| > max
n |ϕ0
n (pn)|
46i.e. whenever there are suﬃcient economies the consumers of which cannot aﬀord
to pay the international price for the crop. The smaller the set of the economies
in which consumers demand the crop at the international price {n : p ≤ pn
0},
the smaller the elasticity of the integration aggregate demand, the larger the
value of κ{n:p≤pn
0} a b o v eo n e ,a n dt h em o r el i k e l yb e c o m e st h ea b o v ei n e q u a l i t y .
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
The regional integration equilibrium price p of M identical regions m ∈ M,
each with an identical autarkic equilibrium price pm,w i l ls a t i s f y :
X
m
Dm(p)=
X
m
Sm(p) ⇔ MDm(p)=MSm(p)= ⇒ p = pm
From:
ϕ0(p)=
S0(p)
D0(p)
=
X
m
D0
m(p)
D0(p)
ϕ0
m(p)
and because D0(p)=
P
m:p≤pm
0 D0
m (p)=MD0
m(p)1{p≤pm
0 } implies that
D0
m(p)
D0(p) =
1
M since p ≤ pm
0 , we have ϕ0(p)=
P
m
1
Mϕ0
m(p)=ϕ0
m(p). And by p =
pm,ϕ 0(p)=ϕ0
m(pm). Therefore,
|ϕ0(p)| < 1 ⇔ |ϕ0
m(pm)| < 1 ⇔ S0
m(pm) < |D0
m(pm)|
and proposition 3 in the text is extended to the class of non-linear agricultural
economies; so that, conditional to an initial price restriction p0 ∈ N (p), p is
LSR if and only if pm is also LSR. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
Part (i): As only supply aggregates, αm =
D0
m(p)
D0
m(p) =1and (pm − p) > 0.
Since aggregate demand is concave, this last fact implies that
D0
m(pm)
D0
m(p) > 1.
As well, the concavity of supply implies that
S0
m(p)
S0
m(pm) > 1. Incorporating these
observations in the above deﬁnition of the eductive stability condition of the
integration equilibrium price, yields:
ϕ0 (p)=
X
m
αm
D0
m (pm)
D0
m (p)
S0
m (p)
S0
m (pm)
ϕ0
m (pm) ≤
X
m
ϕ0
m (pm)
Because of the cobweb functions being (weakly) decreasing and αm
D
0
m(pm)
D0
m(p)
S
0
m(p)
S0
m(pm) >
1. Taking absolute values on both sides of the inequality, and noticing that
ϕ0
m (.) < 0,∀m :
|ϕ0 (p)| ≥
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X
m
ϕ0
m (pm)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=
X
m
|ϕ0
m (pm)| ≥ |ϕ0
m (pm)|
47So that the integration equilibrium price is more unstable than the original
autarkic equilibrium.
Part (ii): As only demand aggregates, (pm−p) < 0,∀m. Since both aggregate
demand and supply are concave, this implies that
D0
m(pm)
D0
m(p) < 1 and
S0
m(p)
S0
m(pm) < 1.
Incorporating these observations in the above deﬁnition of the eductive stability
condition of the integration equilibrium price, yields:
ϕ0 (p)=αm
D0
m (pm)
D0
m (p)
S0
m (p)
S0
m (pm)
ϕ0
m (pm) ≥ ϕ0
m (pm)
Because ϕ0
m (.) < 0,∀m and αm
D
0
m(pm)
D0
m(p)
S
0
m(p)
S0
m(pm) < 1, taking absolute values on
both sides of the inequality:
|ϕ0 (p)| ≤ |ϕ0
m (pm)|
The inequality above states that the resulting integration equilibrium price is
more stable than the original autarkic equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1
First, if there are no diﬀerences in the maximal willingnesses to pay across
regions,
P
m:p≤pm
0 D0
m (p)=
P
m D0
m (p) and ϕ0 (p)=
P
m αmϕ0
m (p). Although
for non-linear economies ϕ0
m (p) 6= ϕ0
m (pm) since
ϕ0
m (p)=
D0
m (pm)
D0
m (p)
S0
m (p)
S0
m (pn)
ϕ0
m (pm)
we can rather expand ϕ0
m (.) as:
ϕ0
m (p)=ϕ0
m (pm)+( p − pm)
Z 1
0
ϕ00
m [pm + ζ(p − pm)]dζ
Which plugged into ϕ0 (p) yields:
ϕ0 (p)=
X
m
αmϕ0
m (pm)+
X
m
αm(p − pm)
Z 1
0
ϕ00
m [pm + ζ(p − pm)]dζ
| {z }
≡R≷0
Then ϕ0 (p) − R =
P
m αmϕ0
m (pm), which is a convex combination of the au-
tarkic stability conditions. Therefore, taking absolute values on both sides:
min
m |ϕ0
m (pm)| ≤ |ϕ0 (p) − R| ≤ max
m |ϕ0
m (pm)|
Using the property that |ϕ0 (p) − R| ≥ ||ϕ0 (p)| − |R|| and adding +|R| to both
sides of the second inequality in the above expression, we obtain:
|ϕ0 (p)| = ||ϕ0 (p)| − |R| + |R|| ≤ ||ϕ0 (p)| − |R|| + |R| ≤ max
m |ϕ0
m (pm)| + |R|
48Reaching the desired conclusion, for even if max
m |ϕ0
m (pm)| < 1, so that all au-
tarkic integrating economies are expectationally stable, the regional integration
of them need not (even without diﬀerences in the maximal willingnesses to pay
across regions). Finally, notice that for economies in the linear class N of propo-
sition 6, R =0so that this proposition extends the results obtained there. But
as well, notice that even in the non-linear case it can happen that R =0 , as it
is the case when the integrating economies are identical (proposition 9 above).
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2
We have to prove that p ∈
h
min
m pm,max
m pm
i
. By contradiction, suppose
that p>max
m pm. Call m ∈ M the region the autarkic equilibrium of which
is max
m pm ≡ pm. By (A.1.) and p>pm, Sm(p) >S m(pm)=Dm(pm) >
Dm(p). As p>pm ≡ max
m pm we have that p>pm,∀m 6= m and by (A.1.),
Sm(p) >S m(pm)=Dm(pm) >D m(p),∀m 6= m. Summing over all economies, P
m Sm(p)=S(p) >D (p)=
P
m Dm(p), a contradiction. Assuming that that
p<min
m pm and denoting by m ∈ M the region whose autarkic equilibrium
is min
m pm, by reversing the inequalities in the preceding reasoning we similarly
reach a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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